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No. 1104

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INTERNATIONAL

KAPITSA ON PRC'S HEGEMONIST FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 80 signed to press 5 Sep 80 pp 22-40

[Article by M.S. Kapitsa: "The Hegemonist Essence of Beijing's Foreign Policy"]

[Text] For many years the Chinese leadership has been stubbornly asserting that a policy of hegemonism is being pursued not by the country headed by them but by the two "superpowers" and one of them in particular--the Soviet Union. China, on the other hand, "will never aspire to hegemony or to become a superpower,"[1] its representative on the First Committee of the UN General Assembly 34th Session declared. This country's statesmen make many such declarations. Beijing evidently proceeds from the fact that the thicker the smokescreen, the more difficult it will be for people to discern through it the real facts. Let us turn to them.

"We must conquer the earth. Our target is the earth.... I believe that most important of all is our earth, where we will create a mighty power. We must unfailingly be imbued with this resolve." These are the words of Mao Zedong and were spoken at an enlarged session of the CCP Central Committee Military Council on 11 September 1959.[2] Hegemonist, aggressive dreams were not only characteristic of Mao Zedong; they embrace the entire present Chinese ruling clique. They were born in China in the soil of the traditional, "Confucian" view of the world and the petit bourgeois ideology launched by the "great helmsman" and professed by his successors.

As is known, the Maoists, who had at one time reviled Confucius, who lived more than 2,400 years ago, carefully protected his concept of Sinocentrism. The "terrestrial" ([tyan'sya]) in the Confucian concept is the surrounding world and the sphere of power of the Chinese emperor inasmuch as he is the son of heaven (Chun-Tzu), which expresses to him its mandate (T'ien Ming). [Tyan'sya] is simultaneously also the Chinese Empire, including all peoples and states which exist in this world. Therefore boundaries and the independence of states are conditional. The Chinese emperor determines the order "terrestrially." Since he lived in China, this country is the center of the world and has the highest culture. As the son of heaven, all "barbarian" states must be completely in his power.

Mao Zedong revived this Confucian concept of China's commanding role in the world and began to cultivate and inculcate it in the country in every possible way. The petit bourgeois mentality of Mao Zedong and his group determined Beijing's increased nationalist, great-power longings.

Earlier the CCP had pointed to the danger of great-power chauvinism and to the need for struggle against it. A RENMIN RIBAO editorial article observed in December 1956: "We Chinese must remember particularly that in the periods of the Han, T'ang, Ming and Ch'ing dynasties our country also was a great empire, although in the course of approximately 100 years, from the latter half of the 10th century, having become the object of aggression, it was turned into a semicolony; although our country presently is still backward economically and culturally, when conditions change, a trend toward great-power chauvinism will undoubtedly be a serious danger if it is not averted to the utmost. It should also be pointed out that such a danger has already begun to manifest itself at the present time among certain of our workers."[3] Nevertheless, the danger of great-power chauvinism against which the Chinese internationalist-communists cautioned at that time became a reality.

Territorial Claims

No one in the world makes territorial claims on such a large number of states or claims such a vast territory (over 10 million square kilometers) as the PRC leaders. Beijing attempts here to substantiate these claims and provide them with a "historical basis." China, the great-Han hegemonists claim, at different times occupied land between Kamchatka and the Philippines, Lake Balkhash and India and between the Ryukyu Archipelago and Afghanistan. Eleven present-day sovereign states and considerable parts of a further eight countries are, they believe, "lost territories" which once belonged to the Middle State and were even incorporated in it.

While still in the Yenan caves Mao Zedong lamented in his work "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," which was written in December 1939,[4] the fact that China had lost, he said, much of its land. But having settled in in the former imperial palace in T'ien An Men, he began to hatch the idea of somehow presenting a list of the "lost territories." A map was published in the PRC in 1953 on which many present-day states, which China had allegedly "lost" entirely or partially, were included within the boundaries of the Ch'ing Empire. And although RENMIN RIBAO asserted in October 1978 that this map had been put out by a private bookstore and that the government had never agreed with it, the newspaper did not state that the PRC has no territorial claims against its neighbors.[5] A similar map was again published in 1978 in a history textbook, and prior to this, in 1972, a "World Atlas" was published in which the land of certain neighboring states was termed "lost" by China.

A PRC Foreign Ministry paper of 8 October 1969, which was put out on the eve of Soviet-Chinese talks on clarifying the border in certain sectors, set out the following version of the formation of China's territory: "China was a single multinational state more than 2,000 years ago. And China always existed in the world as a multinational state, irrespective of how feudal dynasties replaced one another and of which nationality ruled in the country."[6]

In spite of logic and historical truth, those who have been entrusted with theoretically substantiating Beijing's territorial claims show that from the earliest times the Chinese people have represented "a hand with many fingers inseparably linked with one another" and that they are composed of many national groups. For example, they attempt in the "History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression in China,"

publication of which began in China in 1978, to reduce the history of the Manchurian-Tunghu national groups, the Mongols, the Turkic peoples and others to the history of the "single and indivisible" Chinese state. Today's authors assert that whether China at the time of the Han and T'ang dynasties sent its armies far beyond the country, whether the Khitans (Liao Dynasty), Juchen (Ch'ing), Mongols (Yuan) and Manchurians (Ch'ing) created their empires on the basis of China and contiguous countries, whether the Ch'ing Empire invaded Russian Priamur'ye or captured Mongol land--all these were events within the Chinese state. The struggle of the non-Chinese peoples for their independence, on the other hand, is interpreted in this publication as "treason and an endeavor to split the motherland."

Together with arguments about the "lost territories," Beijing is elaborating legends designed to substantiate more far-reaching claims. Genghis Khan's successors reached Western Asia and Central Europe with their armies. Why not represent these conquests as Chinese? the Beijing strategists thought, and turned Genghis Khan into a figure who allegedly performed "a progressive role in the history of China as a whole"[7] and a further "40 states."[8] And quite recently GUANGMING RIBAO claimed that "the Mongolian people may be considered a national minority of China and Genghis Khan the ruler of a Chinese (!) national minority."[9]

It should be noted that the non-Chinese peoples, with whose historical fate Beijing is attempting to juggle, categorically refute the proposition of a "single" and "indivisible" Chinese state. The GUANGMING RIBAO article was regarded in Mongolia as a flagrant falsification of history and as evidence that Beijing has not abandoned annexationist claims on the Mongolian People's Republic.[10] It was again emphasized that settled China and the nomadic peoples of Central Asia and Mongolia represented two independent ethnic and economic-cultural centers of civilization and that each has its own history and culture.[11]

At the time of the "cultural revolution" in the PRC the idea of the seizure of foreign territory was expressed openly in Beijing. "The Chinese people are morally prepared to struggle with might and main for the return of the lost territories which once belonged to China," RENMIN RIBAO said.[12]

Sensing a serious obstacle to their expansion to the north and northwest, the Chinese aggressors are looking greedily at Southeast Asia, regarding it as a "soft underbelly." At a session of the Central Committee Politburo in August 1965 Mao Zedong said: "We must unfurl the flag to hold of Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Singapore.... A region like Southeast Asia is very rich, there are very many natural minerals there, and it will be very much worth what it costs to acquire it. In the future it will be very useful for the development of Chinese industry. Our losses would be fully recouped. After we get hold of Southeast Asia, we will be able to increase our forces in this region; then we will be able to have our own forces encircling the Soviet-East European bloc, and the wind from the East will overpower the wind from the West."[13] The American professor A.D. Barnett states that "in the years to come China will regard Southeast Asia as a region of its specific interests."[14] Relying on local elements in these countries supported by China, the Beijing strategists' plan is to undermine the political structure of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, strive for the establishment of pro-Beijing regimes there and reach the shores of the straits of Malacca and Singapore and India's eastern borders. In February-March 1979 China invaded Vietnam, endeavoring to capture part of its territory.

The PRC's expansionist plans also extend to the Pacific. Since 1974 the Chinese authorities have been taking practical steps to establish control over the islands in the South China Sea and make it part of China's internal waters. "Our hopes... of returning the Nan'sha (Spratley--M.K.) Islands and others have not been realized at the present time," RENMIN RIBAO lamented in March 1977 and made the call: "Faced with this fact, our navy must be developed and strengthened even more."15 The PRC's territorial claims conceal a serious threat to the security of China's neighbors and peace throughout the world.

But Beijing is not confining itself to its own claims to the land of others. It is attempting to cause border chaos worldwide. The Chinese leaders are stirring up Japan's claims to certain islands of the Kurile chain which are a part of the USSR, for a number of years encouraged Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore, provoked the Pol Potites war against Vietnam, are gambling on the quarrel between Pakistan and India over Kashmir and are fanning the disagreements between Bangladesh and India in connection with the distribution of the waters of the River Ganges. They are also claiming that the postwar settlement of the question of boundaries in Europe is not complete and supporting the propositions of certain circles on the Rhine regarding a "single German nation" and their claims to West Berlin.

According to the calculations of the Chinese rulers, in the situation of world chaos which they dream about it will be possible to bring about wars between states more quickly and embark more easily on the realization of their own aggressive aspirations.

From Alliance With the World Revolutionary Forces to Bloc-Forming With Imperialism

Even at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's the Chinese leadership was attempting to impose on the world socialist system and the international communist and national liberation movement Mao Zedong's thoughts, portraying them as the "pinnacle of Marxism-Leninism" and the key to the "revolutionary" reorganization of the world. A philosophy textbook published in China in 1962 pointed out that they represent "a new development of the propositions of Marxism-Leninism concerning revolutions in the colonial and semicolonial countries" and are "the sole truth of the liberation proper of the colonial and semicolonial peoples" and are becoming "the Marxism-Leninism of the era, when imperialism is in decline and socialism is heading for victory."

Mao and his supporters justified their avant-garde aspirations thus: "The wind from the East blows stronger than the wind from the West." The zone of future revolutionary storms was Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these backward peasant regions revolutions would develop in accordance with the Chinese model. The center of world revolution had allegedly shifted further east--to the PRC.

Endeavoring to clear the path to the establishment of Beijing's hegemonism, at the start of the 1960's the Chinese leaders began to persistently propagandize the propositions that the socialist community and the international communist and national liberation movements had strayed from the revolutionary path, had forgotten the tasks of the struggle against imperialism and were harboring illusions as regards the possibility of preserving peace, whereas it was necessary to struggle against it "spearhead to spearhead," and if a nuclear war broke out in which half of mankind

perished, it would only accelerate the victory of socialism worldwide, and the strength of the earth's population would quickly be restored and a thousand times higher civilization would be created.[16] Beijing was ready to assume the leadership of this course inasmuch as China, they said, was the most implacable and most consistent fighter against imperialism. Less than 20 years would pass, and those determining policy in Beijing would be speaking of the parallel strategic interests of the PRC and the United States and appealing for the creation together with the Western powers and Japan of a single front against the USSR, which is allegedly "enemy No 1" and the principal source of war. And this metamorphosis would occur because, having failed to impose its platform on the main revolutionary forces of the present day, the Maoists waged a ferocious struggle against the socialist community, which reached its apogee in the military provocations on the Soviet borders in 1969 and the aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1979. Moving to the left, the Maoists ultimately emerged on the right, forming a bloc with imperialism and operating in its service.

The logic of the slide into the positions of accomplice of imperialism led to the point where on 3 April 1979 the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives (AAPR) Standing Committee abrogated the Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty between the PRC and the USSR of 14 February 1950. It had, it was said, performed its historical role in guaranteeing the security of China and the Soviet Union, in promoting the friendship and cooperation of the two countries and in the defense of peace in the Far East and worldwide, but big changes had taken place in the international situation, for example, relations between the USSR and Japan and, subsequently, between China and Japan had been normalized, and its provisions concerning Japan were allegedly obsolete. Furthermore, its stipulated commitments had been violated not, allegedly, through the fault of the PRC.

In a statement of 4 April 1979 the Soviet Government evaluated this hostile act as having ensued from the abrupt turn in the policy of China's leading clique to the right and its adventurism and aspiration to hegemony.[17]

While giving notice of the decision to abrogate the treaty the PRC Government proposed that talks be held on the settlement of unsolved questions between China and the Soviet Union and on an improvement in their relations. Although there was no logic in this position of Beijing's, the Soviet Union, which has always advocated the normalization of relations with China, agreed on 17 April to begin such and discuss as an initial basis the question of the formulation of a document on the principles of mutual relations between the USSR and the PRC. Subsequently, in a 4 June 1979 memorandum the Soviet side presented the initiative of the inclusion in this document of a provision on the nonrecognition of anyone's claims to special rights or hegemony in Asia and in world affairs. A government delegation led by Wang Yupin arrived in Moscow on 23 September. At its proposal the parties agreed to hold the Soviet-Chinese talks alternately in Moscow and Beijing. It was also decided that the delegations would work without an agenda and that each could raise questions it deemed necessary. The Moscow stage lasted from 27 September through 30 November 1979. They are to be continued in Beijing at a later date.

At the very first plenary session on 17 October 1979 the Soviet side handed over to the Chinese delegation a draft Declaration of the Principles of Mutual Relations

between the USSR and the PRC. The question of the formulation of the said principles between the USSR and the PRC had arisen because the important element of a political-legal foundation for relations between the two countries was lost with the abrogation of the 1950 treaty. Such a declaration would, of course, have facilitated the settlement of questions which have built up between the USSR and the PRC.

The Chinese delegation made the elaboration of this document dependent on a settlement of "unsolved questions" and the "removal of obstacles." The talks in Moscow were accompanied by Beijing's feverish activity and visits and meetings, in the course of which the Chinese leaders organized parallel actions with the imperialist powers and appealed for the creation of an international coalition for struggle against the USSR. The propaganda campaign raised in China in connection with the events in Afghanistan acquired a particularly shrill nature. Conversing on 24 January 1980 with the latest group of visitors from the United States, Deng Xiaoping declared that China had to build up its strength and that the United States and other countries should do the same. But even this, he said, is not enough: it is essential that all unite in a serious struggle against the USSR.[18]

Undermining the Unity of the Socialist Community

A manifestation of great-power hegemonism is Beijing's practice of defining which countries are socialist and which have "ceased" to be such. At the Ninth CCP Congress, for example, only Albania, besides China, was ranked as a socialist state. Applying a differentiated approach, Chinese leaders are attempting increasingly persistently to influence the socialist countries. The purpose is to cause difficulties in the socialist states' relations with the Soviet Union and to nudge them toward "neutrality" in the PRC's struggle against the USSR and subsequently, possibly, drag them over to Chinese positions.

The policy of the Chinese leadership is being constructed with regard for the particular features of the position and policy of each socialist country. Beijing's leaders have stepped up their activity on the development of relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; precisely these states were the first to be favored with visits in 1978 by Hua Guofeng, chairman of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council. Beijing is attempting to influence the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by means of pressure. Flagrant pressure and even the use of force is being applied to neighboring Vietnam; pressure is increasing on the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

While rendering Vietnam assistance during its struggle against imperialist aggression, Beijing simultaneously endeavored to show up its influence in Indochina and at the same time take advantage of the Vietnamese people's heroic struggle to prompt the United States to move toward an improvement in relations with China. "Taiwan for Vietnam"--one American newspaper had it.[19]

In the period 1970-1972 the PRC's leaders attempted to create under their leadership an "Alliance of Revolutionary Peoples of Asia" with the participation of the PRC, the DPRK, the DRV, the Republic of South Vietnam, Indonesia, the Pathet-Lao

and the National United Front of Kampuchea (a kind of "axis"), but the proposed partners readily understood that the great-power nationalists in Beijing wished to have in the form of such a bloc an instrument for their expansion in the Far East and Southeast Asia. This idea was opposed particularly strenuously by Vietnam. It was for precisely this reason that the Maoists stepped up subversive activity in Laos and Kampuchea, endeavoring to weaken their friendly ties to the DRV.

Beijing was extremely dissatisfied that Vietnam did not share anti-Sovietism and that the anti-Marxist "three worlds" concept found no support there. The Vietnamese authorities put a stop to the anti-Soviet propaganda which PRC representatives were attempting to conduct in the country, particularly via the [khuatsyao] (so-called ethnic Chinese) living in Vietnam. Chinese troops' seizure in 1974 of the Paracel Islands, which belonged to the DRV, was greeted with profound anger in Vietnam. The proposition put forward by Vietnam that Southeast Asia belongs to its peoples[20] was given a hostile reception in Beijing. The Chinese rulers discerned in it a threat to their plans of expansion southward. From time to time they would complicate the situation on the border between the PRC and the DRV.

The victory of the Vietnamese people and the country's unification within the framework of a single Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which was proclaimed on 2 July 1976, its implementation of an independent foreign policy and its pursuit of a course toward strengthening the unity of the socialist community elicited a negative reaction in Beijing. The Chinese leaders were increasingly persuaded that this country not only did not wish to serve as an instrument of their aggressive policy in Southeast Asia but, on the contrary, was counteracting Beijing's expansion. Then incidents came to be staged systematically on Vietnam's border, and Chinese propaganda noisily trumpeted that the Paracel, Spratley and other islands in the South China Sea had long belonged to China and not Vietnam.[21]

Back at the time of the war of national liberation in Cambodia Beijing, using N. Sihanouk and simultaneously broadening contacts with the "Red Khmers," was striving to make this country a political counterweight to Vietnam. With the fall of the Lon Nol clique it established "special relations" with Phnom Penh. Incited and armed by Beijing, in May 1975 the rulers in Phnom Penh began to make armed raids on Vietnamese territory which later assumed the nature of an undeclared war. When, however, in January 1979 the bloody Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime was ousted by the insurgent people and Beijing lost its ally, it rained down the full force of its fury on Vietnam.

The [khuatsyao], over 1 million of whom lived in this country, were used to undermine its economy. In May-June 1978 the PRC cut off technical assistance in the construction of enterprises in Vietnam, and Chinese specialists were recalled.

After threats and provocations, on 17 February 1979 China initiated armed aggression against Vietnam in order, as Deng Xiaoping stated during his visit to the United States, to "punish" it. Chinese troops invaded the territory of Vietnam almost the length of the border and captured a number of centers of population in the border zone. Vietnam decisively repulsed the interventionists, and the adventure cost Beijing the lives of several tens of thousands of soldiers and a large quantity of military equipment; the political and moral losses which China suffered in the eyes

of peoples of the world, who discerned more clearly the habits of its rulers and who condemned this aggression, are incalculable. Instead of the "punishment" of Vietnam, the Chinese militarists themselves were soundly beaten, and on 5 March Beijing was forced to announce that it was starting to withdraw its troops. But even during the withdrawal they continued to destroy cities and villages, blew up public buildings, factories, plants, schools and bridges and engaged in looting and robbery. "The military adventure of the clique of Chinese reactionaries against our country suffered shameful failure," NHAN DAN observed. "This clique received a big lesson and paid a big price for it with far-reaching consequences. The clique of adventurists could not have foreseen that it would have been delivered such a retaliatory blow by our army and people and also by the world revolutionary forces and progressive mankind."[22]

Vietnamese-Chinese talks began on 18 April 1979 at deputy foreign minister level during which Beijing began to strive for Vietnam's virtual capitulation: it insisted that Vietnam renounce sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratley islands and dictated to Vietnam its line of conduct with respect to Laos and Kampuchea. It endeavored to indicate what international treaties Vietnam would "have a right" to conclude; and it demanded that hundreds of thousands of [khuatsyao], whom the Beijing authorities themselves had forced to emigrate to the PRC, be allowed to return to Vietnam. The Vietnamese side categorized these terms as crippling and emphasized that it would not submit to pressure and was fully resolved to defend the integrity of the motherland. Beijing kept up its threats to "teach a second lesson" and continued military provocations on the border with Vietnam. The Chinese authorities broke off the talks with Vietnam in March 1980. Claiming that Vietnam is a threat to Thailand and all Southeast Asia, Beijing is calling for the revival of SEATO, the ASEAN countries' open confrontation with the Indochina states and for the joint aggressive operations of the United States and the PRC.

Even during the Indochinese peoples' struggle against American intervention Beijing was taking steps to prepare the ground for the establishment of a protectorate over Laos. Chinese units, which had been brought in at the time of the Souvanna Phouma government, remained in the country and built a strategic highway there. Beijing attempted to entice to its side the Chinese bourgeois in Laos. When, under the influence of the growing revolutionary-liberation movement in the country, power came to reside fully in the hands of the patriotic forces in December 1975, the establishment of close cooperation between Vietnam and Laos was manifestly not to the liking of the Chinese leaders.

China dispatched its regular troops to the borders of Laos and sent in its spies and scouts to engage in subversive propaganda and intimidation of the population and to split the ranks of the multinational Laotian peoples.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic Government demanded an immediate halt to the concentration of troops on the border, actions threatening the country's independance, sovereignty and territorial integrity and also interference in its internal affairs.[23]

The Beijing authorities, whose proteges destroyed Kampuchea and killed approximately 3 million people, are giving this country no peace. They summoned the Pol Pot bands to war against the people's power and are supplying them with arms and material

resources and, together with Washington, are prompting the ASEAN countries toward interference in the affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and attempting to ostracize it in the international arena. There are numerous bases on Thai territory where the Pol Pot rabble is sheltering and from where, with the assistance of China and the United States, it is making attacks on Kampuchea's border regions.

The "Three Worlds" Doctrine--Chinese Instrument of Subverting the National Liberation Movement

Beijing's leaders are also endeavoring to implement their hegemonist designs with respect to the developing countries and the national liberation movement.

Beijing's "three worlds" doctrine[24] is an integral part of these designs. This concept was set forth publicly for the first time on 10 April 1974 in a speech by Deng Xiaoping, deputy premier of the PRC State Council and head of the Chinese delegation at the UN General Assembly Sixth Special Session. Without referring to the authorship of Mao Zedong, he sketched the following outline of the alinement of forces in the international arena: "The United States and the USSR constitute the first world. The developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and other regions the third world. The developed countries, which are between the above-mentioned two worlds, the second world." Deng described the "first world" as the biggest exploiter and oppressor and also as the center of a new world war inasmuch as, allegedly, the "two superpowers" incorporated therein are engaged in a deadly fight for hegemony. The countries of the "second world," on the other hand, are, he said, mainly adversaries of the "two superpowers," although they also have "certain contradictions" with the developing states, and certain of them even "still preserve colonial relations with them in various forms." The numerous developing countries forming the "third world" "represent a revolutionary driving force pushing forward the wheel of world history and also the main force in the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and, particularly, the superpowers." The PRC was also assigned a place in this outline: "China is a socialist country and at the same time a developing country. China belongs to the third world."[25]

Amendments were made to the "doctrine" 3 years later. An article carried in RENMIN RIBAO on 1 November 1977 asserted: "The socialist countries, as the bulwark of the international proletariat, together with the oppressed nations, which are subjected to the most serious oppression and exploitation and which constitute the majority of the world's population, form the third world."[26] As far as the other two "worlds" were concerned, their interpretation remained virtually the same, with, however, one appreciable difference in the formula of the "first world." The USSR was placed ahead and declared "a more dangerous center of world war than the United States" and the "main target of the struggle (for the Chinese leadership--M.K.) against hegemonism."

Thus the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the two opposed social systems was replaced by the antiscientific, subjectivist plan of "division into three worlds." This plan not only has no independent place for but, furthermore, the very existence of the world socialist system was simply considered "unnecessary."

A particular role in the "three worlds" plan was assigned the "third world." The Chinese leaders regard precisely the "third world" as the horse which is to carry

the Beijing rider to the heights commanding the world. According to their plans, the center of the world should be China, and other countries and peoples obedient outlying territories. The American professor M. Oxenberg observed: "The Chinese as a nation are not completely satisfied with bilateral relations among equals. Although Beijing declares that its policy is based on mutual benefit, the way in which it builds these relations creates a strong sense of hierarchy."[27]

But even the "third world" appeared insufficient to Beijing. With the proposition of the "antihegemonist potential" of the "second world," in which category the main imperialist powers (except for the United States) were placed, and the postulate that American imperialism is moving into a decline and that rising up to replace it, they say, is "Soviet social-imperialism" and that the United States is the "target of Soviet expansion" the Maoists came to the following conclusion: imperialism could be an ally of China and "even American imperialism could possibly be included in a united front." Deng Xiaoping's statement to the director general of AFP in October 1977 that not only the "second" and "third" worlds but also part of the "first world" in the shape of the United States should be a part of the "broadest united front" left no doubt on this score. Two years later, during his visit to Washington, Deng Xiaoping called for the creation of a front of the United States, Japan, the West European states and China against the USSR.

China has not confined itself to appeals for unity of action with imperialist forces, it has in practice entered into collusion with them in order with the help of, as it were, dual thrust--Beijing and imperialist--to attempt to resist the progressive trends of the development of the emancipated peoples.

As is known, during the liberation struggle in Angola the PRC operated in a united front with imperialist, racist and reactionary forces. Cuba's GRANMA correctly observed: "Imperialism, the South African regime and Maoism have joined in a repulsive alliance against the People's Republic of Angola and its people."[28]

China's leaders approved of the Sudan military authorities' reprisals against the left forces and welcomed the Western powers' intervention in Zaire aimed at putting down the uprising in Shaba Province and urgently dispatched arms to the Mobutu regime; China was sympathetic to Somalia's aggression against Ethiopia. Beijing supported the idea put forward by the Western powers of the formation of inter-African forces which would perform police functions; this, it was said, is "an excellent example of African solidarity in the struggle against hegemony."[29] China also expressed itself in favor of plans for knocking together a grouping of Red Sea countries[30] under the sham slogan of a "zone of peace and security." "The times have passed when Beijing diplomacy was aimed, as was the case in the 1950's and the start of the 1960's, at encouraging revolutionary movements in the third world," an American newspaper[31] stated with satisfaction.

If on the African continent China has acted as the accomplice and ally of imperialism and colonialism, in the Near East and in Asia the expansionism of its foreign policy has been graphically displayed. The Camp David collusion of the ruling circles of the United States, Israel and Egypt aimed against the Arab peoples was greeted with approval in the PRC. Beijing is now actively supplying the Sadat regime with arms and spare parts. Up to the last day the Chinese authorities supported

the tyranny of the shah in Iran[32] and recognized the new authority in this country very reluctantly and not immediately. Beijing approved the American policy of pressure and threats against Iran and did not even vote against a draft Security Council resolution on the American blockade.

Beijing gave the April revolution in Afghanistan an extremely hostile reception. It is provoking and assisting operations hostile to the democratic republic and the reactionary, feudal forces inside the country fighting with arms against the democratic regime. A bloc of imperialism, primarily American, the Chinese hegemonists and Pakistan militarists, who are waging an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has been formed. Pakistan has become the joint beachhead of the imperialists, Beijing hegemonists and international reaction from which war is being waged against Afghanistan.

PRC policy in respect of South Asia is distinguished by its double-dealing nature. On the one hand, not burdening itself with principles and building its policy on a state-of-the-market basis, Beijing gives the appearance of supporting normalization and the development of good-neighborly relations between the states of the subcontinent and the strengthening of its own relations with them and, on the other, has seized 35,000 square kilometers of Indian territory, is kindling quarrels and contradictions between Pakistan and India, Bangladesh and India and Nepal and India and whipping up tension. The Karakorum Highway is being used to ship arms to Pakistan and to create a military threat to India and Afghanistan. The favorite method of China's policy in this region is, as before, secret or open support for a variety of antigovernment forces and movements, from left extremists through rightwing religious fanatics.

For many years Beijing has been urging on the Naga and Mizo national minorities to armed demonstrations against the Indian Government, and the separatists are undergoing training in China and receiving arms from it. Encouraged by China and the United States, in the summer of 1980 they perpetrated a number of acts of violence in India's northeastern provinces.[33]

Beijing regards the Southeast Asian countries as a region which in the future is to come under Chinese control. While flirting with the authorities of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and declaring recognition of ASEAN and a readiness to cooperate with this association Beijing is at the same time training insurgent armies in these countries in order, when the time comes, to destabilize the political situation with their help and implant pro-Chinese regimes; Beijing's provocation of civil war in Burma is particularly cynical.

Undermining Detente--A Priority Goal of Chinese Hegemonism

Addressing the Second Session of the Eighth CCP Congress in May 1958, Mao Zedong said: "War, so be it. It will make it possible to completely do away with imperialism more quickly. I believe it would be possible to do away with it in 3 years. With atomic bombs, the war might last a year less than hitherto. But then there would be no more wars. If there is war, there will, consequently, be those that die. Death is not terrible. If out of 600 million people (China's population in 1968--M.K.) half die, 300 million will remain.... If during the war half of mankind perishes, this is of no significance. It is not terrible if one-third of the population remains. The population will increase once again after so many years."[34]

"A third huge world war cannot be avoided," Deng Xiaoping asserted in a conversation with Japanese journalists on 21 July 1975. "So many people will, perhaps, die in this war. But this war will facilitate the solution of the questions of the oppressed nations and mankind. It is not that bad." Hua Guofeng declared at the Ninth CCP Congress that the outbreak of world war "does not depend on people's will."[35]

Having encountered the world public's sharp condemnation of Beijing's inflammatory role, the Chinese leaders amended somewhat their proposition concerning the "inevitability" of war. The proposition of the possibility of it being "deferred" was added. "World war," PRC representative Chen Chu declared on 29 November 1977 in the First Committee at the UN General Assembly 32d Session, "although inevitable, could be deferred."[36] Hua Guofeng made active use of this proposition during his visit to West European countries at the end of 1979.

Beijing's leaders are calling for expanded material and organizational preparations against "aggressive wars" and "preparations in the sphere of military equipment," that is, for an intensification of the arms race worldwide. They are calling, finally, for a struggle against "sham," "notorious" detente and "sham," "notorious" disarmament, for the "abandonment of a policy of appeasement" and for "increased struggle against the policy of appeasement" (Beijing's name for detente) for "it can only bring war closer."

Another aspect of the "deferral of war" until the end of the current century is no less important. The time "until the end of the present century" coincides with the period for the accomplishment of the task currently emphasized in every possible way by the Beijing leadership--"making China a strong modern power by the end of the century" or, to decipher its true meaning, making it a powerful militarist state. Together with this Beijing is inciting a world war, attempting to create a system of alliances and blocs. "China and Japan should join their efforts in the East and the West European countries and the United States in the West in order to resist the Soviet Union," Deng Xiaoping stated with frank cynicism in March 1978 to Zimmerman, a CDU member of the West German Bundestag.

Having put forward the proposition of the "inevitability" and even "desirability" of war, Beijing began unprecedented preparations domestically and internationally for the contingency of a world conflict. Militarization has been developed inside the country on a scale not known even in Mao Zedong's lifetime. From day to day the propaganda machinery dins into the heads of the population the idea of the need to prepare for "tomorrow's war." "A large-scale war will break out soon," Ye Jianying prophesied in May 1977. "War is a trial of strength. If we prepare in advance and in full, victory is guaranteed," the newspaper CHIEH FANG CHUN BAO, the organ of the CCP Central Committee Military Council, urged in May 1977. "The factors of war are increasing noticeably, and the danger of a world war is an increasingly serious threat to the peoples of the world," Hua Guofeng declared in February 1978 in the report on the government's work at an AAPR session. The 1980's "will be stormy," "the possibility of an outbreak of a new world war is increasing"--these were the sentiments with which Beijing greeted 1980.[37]

The "four modernizations" policy, which is lauded to the skies, is subordinated entirely to military preparations. There is perhaps no sector of the economy, science

and technology in China today whose development is not regarded exclusively from the viewpoint of its contribution to the buildup of the country's military strength. "We need to accelerate the development of the basic sectors of industry with the accent on steel in order to create a strong basis for our defense industry," it was said in May 1977 at an all-China industry conference. "The modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology--this is the basis and prerequisite in the modernization of state defense," the journal HONGQI[38] emphasized in July 1977. "Modern defense means--atomic and hydrogen bombs and missiles--cannot exist in isolation from science and technology. New military equipment may appear as the result of scientific development. Science is necessary for modernizing our country's defense and for insuring that our country...never be the losing side," RENMIN RIBAO emphasized in September 1977.[39]

As is known, the Chinese leadership trumpets from the housetops that war will begin "with the clash of the two superpowers"; Beijing is persistently intimidating the Americans with the idea that the USSR is "outflanking" them in the "global rivalry" and, furthermore, urging, as it were, the United States and other imperialist powers to be "bolder" in unleashing a war and making it clearly understood that, in the event of one breaking out, it would act on the side of the United States. According to a report of the KYODO agency, Deng Xiaoping, chatting with a group of Japanese members of parliament at the start of September 1977, declared in an inflammatory tone that the United States was capable of beginning a world war but that "it is not bold enough for this." Deng also frequently spoke about the "threat" to the United States on the part of the USSR and about how Washington should deal with the USSR during his visit to the United States in January 1979. For this reason the Beijing leaders were so pleased by the anti-Soviet actions taken by the United States at the start of 1980, which led to the exacerbation of the international situation.[40] The extremely negative and often provocative nature of Beijing's position on fundamental present-day problems, primarily questions of disarmament, is explained precisely by the fact that an atmosphere of an unbridled arms race is better suited to its purpose. It is not fortuitous that in the lexicon of Chinese diplomats detente and disarmament are termed "sham" and "notorious." In July 1972 Zhou Enlai declared that under present conditions "there can be no question of disarmament."[41] At the General Assembly 32d Session the Chinese representatives termed the problem of general and complete disarmament "pure deception."[42] In the 9 years that it has been in the United Nations the PRC has not presented a single constructive proposal for consolidating peace. The Chinese leaders oppose the recognition in international law of the principle of the nonuse of force in relations between states. China has not signed a single international agreement on limiting the arms race, particularly the race in weapons of mass destruction. It opposed the definition of aggression drawn up at the UN General Assembly 29th Session. Irrespective of who is at the helm--Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai or Lin Biao, the gang of four or China's present leaders--the Beijing leadership has always opposed and continues to oppose the very idea of disarmament.

In putting forward the proposition of "not disarmament but the strengthening of defense capability" the Beijing leadership is endeavoring to stir up the arms race worldwide and to continue its own program of building up offensive arms on the quiet.

As soon as it made its appearance in the United Nations the Chinese delegation began to call from the General Assembly platform for a global nuclear race. In his first

speech on disarmament problems on 24 November 1971 the Chinese delegate declared that "in the absence of a total ban on and total destruction of nuclear weapons it cannot be expected that other countries which are subject to threats on the part of the two nuclear powers will not develop nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes."[43] From the following General Assembly 27th Session through the present the Chinese representatives have on the same contrived pretext of the "threat of the nuclear superpowers" advocated the development of nuclear potential or a "nuclear defense capability" by countries "possessing a small quantity of nuclear weapons or which lack such altogether."[44]

In other words, Beijing's position is that nuclear disarmament can only be discussed when all the nuclear powers have built up arsenals of equal strength and the non-nuclear powers have created "their own nuclear defense potential."

Taking the general sentiments of the UN members into consideration, the PRC was forced to participate in the UN General Assembly Special Disarmament Session (May-June 1978). Here Beijing attempted to display an outwardly "constructive" approach, but was in practice negative. Its representative, Huang Hua, asserted that many "third world" countries "lack sufficient possibility for self-defense and need to step up their national defense" and that for this reason they "should not cut back on" any weapons and "should not harbor illusions concerning disarmament." He showed that detente does not exist and that the Soviet-American negotiations are a "deliberate deception."

At the UN General Assembly 33d Session China opposed the Soviet proposal that an international convention be concluded on strengthening guarantees of the security of the nonnuclear states. Huang Hua declared thereat on 28 September 1978 that this Soviet proposal "is actually aimed at tying the arms and legs of numerous medium and small countries and depriving them of a capacity for self-defense."

For Beijing the main thing is to prevent any agreements in the disarmament sphere.

The gamble on war and an endeavor to prevent an improvement in the international atmosphere explains the resistance to the measures to strengthen security and develop cooperation in Europe and also the idea of security in Asia on the basis of the efforts of the states of this continent.

Beijing would like to see West Europe as a force which would put political and military pressure on the USSR from the Western flank, thereby making it easier for China to implement its expansionist policy and establish hegemony in Asia. This line was formulated by the PRC's leaders back in 1970, when the true meaning and thrust of the Chinese proposition of struggle against the "two superpowers," which came to replace Mao Zedong's so-called "intermediate zones" plan, came to be revealed. Whereas previously Beijing had regarded West Europe as an "object of oppression on the part of the United States" and subsequently began to equate the policy of the USSR and the United States, since 1970 its efforts have in fact concentrated on stirring up West Europe's confrontation with the USSR.

Mao's inventions of the "threat to China from the North" served as justification for the policy of "restraining" the USSR in the West. The subject of the "Soviet threat" was an invariable component of all the Chinese leaders' talks with the representatives of Western countries and, as Canadian Premier P. Trudeau put it, represented

"the central problem of Chinese foreign policy." Beijing spread slanderous fabrications that in the event of a relaxation of tension between East and West, "Soviet troops will arrive at China's northern border," increase pressure on it and even deliver a "preventive strike" at the PRC.

In the mid-1960's Beijing adopted a sharply negative position with respect to the proposals of the socialist countries intended to shift the business of European settlement onto a practical footing and insure practicable prerequisites for the creation of a system of European security and the development of cooperation. Opposition to the program of European settlement was "justified" by demagogic and slanderous arguments about the endeavor of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries "to create in the future an anti-Chinese, anticommunist and antipopular combination."[45]

The PRC leadership exerted considerable effort to debunk the very idea of the convening of an all-European security and cooperation conference, which had been put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist states. In 1969 [Li Syannyan'], deputy premier of the PRC State Council, portrayed the socialist countries' initiative as an attempt "to share a sphere of influence with American imperialism and control and enslave Eastern Europe." Beijing endeavored to frustrate the convening of the conference, slanderously terming it a "conference on insecurity in Europe." In spite of these intrigues, it began its work, but Beijing diplomacy continued to make a big effort even then to impede its successful progress.

Beijing's leaders advocated continuation of the American military presence in West Europe and a strengthening of the European countries' military alliance with the United States. This was expressed by Zhou Enlai in July 1972 at a meeting with the U.S. senators H. Boggs and D. Ford. Zhou Enlai reacted positively to H. Kissinger's proposal of a "new Atlantic charter," saying in June 1973 that he "sees no reason to reject this plan if it is aimed at uniting those who hold identical opinions on curbing the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union." Starting out with the proposition of the "Soviet threat to the West," the Maoists are attempting to instill in representatives of the capitalist countries the need to be "strong" and "vigilant" and to reject the socialist countries' proposals aimed at a relaxation of tension on the European continent. They even went as far as to assert the inevitable and speedy military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West European countries. According to a report in the British newspaper THE TIMES, Deng Xiaoping declared in April 1974 to a West German youth delegation visiting the PRC that "war in Europe is inevitable" and that "it has only been temporarily postponed."[46] In May 1975 Deng Xiaoping set off for France to ascertain the mood in West Europe and at the same time attempt to complicate the convening of the all-European conference. His arguments about the situation in Europe, which were sustained in an anti-Soviet spirit, were not supported by his company. The French Government confirmed its policy of detente.

The Chinese leaders saw West Europe's conversion into a self-sufficient political, economic and military entity as an alternative to all-European cooperation. Taking up the reactionary slogan "Europe for the Europeans,"[47] they joined with the proposition of certain circles in the West "concerning the creation of a Europe for Europeans independent of the two superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union."[48]

The successful completion of the all-European forum signified the total failure of the efforts of the Beijing leaders. The Chinese leadership responded to this with a buildup of the subversive propaganda campaign, making it its task to discredit the results of the conference, to evoke in the European and world public a skeptical attitude toward the new prospects and to prevent a further intensification of detente on the basis of the decisions adopted in Helsinki. Beijing propaganda declared that the Final Act lacks legal force and is no more than an "empty piece of paper" and that therefore the conference on security (its title was invariably enclosed in quotation marks) could afford Europe merely "security on paper."[49]

The principle of the inviolability of borders, which is a key principle in the problem of preventing war in Europe and which consolidates in the interests of peace the results of the victory over fascism in World War II, was attacked particularly maliciously by the Chinese leadership. Beijing declared that the inclusion of this principle in the Final Act perpetuates East Europe's conversion into a "sphere of influence" of the Soviet Union.[50] This attitude, which testifies to the Chinese leadership's violation of the principles of socialist internationalism, was interpreted in the socialist countries as a direct attack on the socialist community.

Excluding war from the life of the peoples is a most intricate historical task, a condition of the accomplishment of which should primarily be military detente. As is known, it is precisely the Chinese leaders which are its consistent opponents, refusing to subscribe to international agreements on disarmament and other measures to strengthen international security.

Hoping to undermine peace and cooperation in Europe, the Beijing leaders welcomed the NATO decision to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in certain West European countries.[51] They go on at length in this connection about the "erroneousness of detente."[52]

Beijing's so hostile attitude toward the intensification of detente in Europe is explained, in addition to all else, by the fear that the "spirit of Helsinki" will exert a favorable influence on the solution of security problems in other regions of the world also, particularly in Asia.

The idea of insuring security on the Asian continent is not new. It was put forward by the Soviet Union back in the 1930's to bar the path to war in Asia and the Pacific. In the 1950's the USSR and the PRC jointly proposed replacing exclusive military groupings with a "system of collective peace and collective security." Taking into consideration the fact that Asia was all the time raging with military conflicts, in 1969 the Soviet Union again declared that "the course of events also puts on the agenda the task of the creation of a collective security system in Asia."[53]

The PRC leaders opposed the Soviet proposal: under the flag of the creation of a security system the USSR was allegedly attempting to "encircle China," create a "new anti-China military alliance" and force the Asian countries "to renounce their sovereignty and independence." According to an AFP correspondent, at a meeting with a group of Japanese members of parliament Zhou Enlai declared in January 1973: the Soviet Union is endeavoring "to subjugate us with its idea of an Asian security system." At an ECAFE session in Tokyo in April 1972 [An' Chzhiyuan'], the head of

the Chinese delegation, attempted to discredit in every way possible the USSR's proposal concerning the creation of a security system in Asia and to portray matters such that the situation in Asia and the Far East was "far from tranquil," but that this was "favorable for the peoples." This approach was fully in accord with the directives of the 10th CCP Congress, which proclaimed "colossal upheavals" in the world "a good, not a bad" thing. Rejecting the idea of a security system in Asia, in October 1975 RENMIN RIBAO wrote that the USSR, allegedly not an Asian country, wished to impose on it and "exercise hegemonism in Asia."[54]

The fact that while sparing no efforts to blacken the idea of the creation of an Asian security system the Beijing politicians and propagandists leave aside the question of the essence of it catches the attention. As is known, the USSR considers the purpose of the creation of such a system in Asia by the forces of the Asian states themselves the eradication of wars and armed conflicts and imperialist aggression, the guarantee for each country and people of conditions for free development and national revival and the establishment of interstate relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and good-neighborly cooperation.[55]

However, Beijing prefers to ignore all that constitutes the very heart of the Soviet initiative.

An Asian security system would clearly prevent the implementation of the plans of the present leaders of China, particularly with respect to Asia, which they have long regarded as their "traditional zone of influence." Beijing links realization of these plans with increased tension on the continent and with the struggle for spheres of influence and a revision of borders, in the course of which it deems permissible the use of all methods, even armed. Behind the attacks on the idea of the creation of security in Asia by the collective efforts of the states of this region Beijing's leaders are carefully concealing their own hegemonist ambitions and an endeavor to be dominant on the continent. And this in no way accords with the principle of the complete equality of all Asian countries contained in the very idea of the system.

It is indicative that in the wake of Beijing the American professor D.S. Zagoria unceremoniously claimed that the Soviet initiative is aimed at containing China and that the main goal of the USSR's Asian policy is the establishment of a "cordon sanitaire" around the PRC.[56] These assertions of the Chinese leaders and the apologists of imperialism are utterly without foundation. "No one has ever," L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, said at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces, "raised the question of the nonparticipation, even less, of some kind of 'isolation' of China (not to mention the fact that it is altogether absurd to think of the 'isolation' of such a large country). As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it would welcome the PRC's participation in measures aimed at strengthening Asian security."[57]

That the creation of such a system is intended to exclude wars and armed conflicts and interference in the affairs of others and to guarantee a spirit of trust and mutual understanding in relations between countries is another matter. It is precisely this that the present Beijing leaders do not want.

Chinese Hegemonism--Ally of Imperialism

Their adventurism and hatred of the socialist countries impress the bellicose imperialist circles, which are still attempting to halt the world revolutionary process, "roll back communism" and preserve and strengthen the position of world and, particularly, American imperialism, with the aid of the so-called "China card" also.

During a visit to China in January 1980 by U.S. Defense Secretary H. Brown the Chinese hosts were told in ample terms that the two countries have many "common and interlocking" interests.[58] On his arrival in Beijing Brown declared that his purpose was to ascertain "how to contribute to broader cooperation" between China and the United States "in matters of security."[59] Speaking at a banquet in Beijing, he emphasized that the cooperation of the United States and China "should serve as a reminder to others that were they to pose a threat to the common interests of the United States and the PRC, we would be able to respond with acts complementing one another not only in the diplomatic sphere but also in the field of defense."[60]

Brown declared at a press conference that the United States and China "are pursuing common strategic goals."[61] American press and mass information media commentaries on the results of Brown's talks in Beijing left no room for doubt that the American and Chinese partners in the politics of hegemonism reached an understanding on questions of interference on the part of the United States and Beijing in the affairs of the Asian countries,[62] particularly concerning coordination of their steps with respect to the militarization of Pakistan[63] and in rendering even broader support to the mercenaries and military formations waging aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. NCNA reported from Beijing on 9 January that "the situation in Afghanistan was discussed in detail" at Hua Guofeng's meeting with Brown and that the sides have "parallel views" on the situation in Indochina and, in particular, on the question of Kampuchea.

The results of Brown's visit to Beijing were greeted with concern in various strata of the foreign public, primarily in the Asian countries, for which the American-Chinese flirtation represents a direct danger. A statement of a representative of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry observed that "the United States has entered into a criminal understanding with the Beijing ruling circles aimed against peace and the national independence of the peoples."[64] Indira Gandhi, chairman of the Indian National Congress Party (I), declared in an interview with the French radio station France-Inter, concerning H. Brown's talks with the Chinese leadership, that this "represents a great danger for us (that is, for India--M.K.) and for the entire region." "China," she emphasized, "also represents a threat to us and harbors the most expansionist intentions. We have already suffered from them."[65] Sh.M. Dost, foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, observed that the United States and China began to afford the counterrevolutionary forces systematic support immediately after the victory of the revolution in Afghanistan. This subversive activity has been stepped up particularly recently. Army subunits of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have repeatedly seized consignments of weapons of American, British, Chinese, and Pakistani manufacture with which the counterrevolutionaries have killed and are continuing to kill activist-revolutionaries and the peaceful population.[66]

Meanwhile Beijing's rapprochement with the imperialists continues. Geng Biao, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and vice premier of the PRC, visited the United States at the end of May-start of June 1980. Both sides again emphasized that they would coordinate their policy and act on parallel courses. The United States agreed to supply the PRC with military transport aircraft, radar installations, electronic machinery and other equipment of a "dual purpose." The U.S. Administration is leaning toward undertaking the modernization of China's military industry.

At the same time, in May, Hua Guofeng paid a visit to Tokyo, where he strove for Japan's further involvement in Beijing's adventurist policy and urged Japan on to hostile acts against the USSR and Vietnam. Agreement was reached on scientific-technical cooperation and on an expansion of Japan's economic assistance to China. Hua Guofeng insistently advised the Japanese Government to increase its military spending.[67]

In tilting toward Beijing Washington is obviously proceeding from the assumption that the Chinese "counterweight" will be sufficiently convenient and manageable and that it will be possible to keep China in the wake of American policy or, in any event, on a parallel course without particular difficulty or risk. But realistically-minded politicians, in the Western countries included, and in the United States itself even, realize that in developing their relations the United States and China are each proceeding from their own interests. Beijing believes that it can best secure its hegemonist interests by pursuing a policy of exacerbating relations between the West and the socialist community states. The United States, on the other hand, regards an intensification of the Soviet-Chinese dispute as the best means of securing its own superiority. Each side would like to drag its partner into a conflict with Moscow and is hoping that precisely it will be left as the biggest winner.[68]

The CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum stated in the decree on the international situation and the Soviet Union's foreign policy that "a rapprochement between aggressive circles of the West, primarily the United States, and the Chinese leadership is occurring on an anti-Soviet basis hostile to the cause of peace. The partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism represents a dangerous new phenomenon in world politics--dangerous for all mankind, including the American and Chinese peoples."[69]

In the light of the facts adduced above it is not surprising that the Chinese representatives behaved so nervously during discussion at the UN General Assembly 34th Session of a resolution on the impermissibility of hegemonism in international relations. The policy of the Chinese ruling clique runs counter to the resolution's provisions, which condemn hegemonism exercised on a global, regional and subregional scale, inasmuch as Beijing is attempting even now to establish its hegemony over the region of Southeast Asia and manifestly aspiring to global hegemony. The mode of action of the Chinese authorities runs counter to this document's provisions, in which the General Assembly resolutely condemns a policy of pressure, the threat of force or its use, direct or indirect aggression and occupation and also the spreading policy of open and covert interference and intervention in states' internal affairs and resolutely condemns all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, the creation of spheres of influence and the division of the world into antagonistic military and political blocs.[70]

Soviet people respect their neighbor--the industrious and talented Chinese people--and wish them prosperity under conditions of peace and would like to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese people. But the present leaders are pushing them onto a different path. The proposition "The 21st Century Is the Century of the Chinese"[71] has been circulated in China. How the present Beijing strategists conceive of this century can be judged from their intentions They wish to engineer a clash between the United States and the USSR and plunge mankind into a world revolutionary war, are counting on swallowing up the territory of almost 20 neighboring states fully or partially and dream of making China the "Middle State" which would rule "the barbarians of the four corners of the world" and "hold all by the forelock and tweak their noses from time to time."

Such a policy is dangerous for mankind. And the sooner this is understood by those who are building illusions regarding the Maoists' love of peace, the greater the probability that China will ultimately again begin to perform a constructive and not destructive role in international relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. UN Doc. A/C.1/34/PV.49 of 30 November 1979, p 24.

2. "Mao Tszedun sysyan van' suy," Beijing, 1967, p 101.

3. RENMIN RIBAO 29 December 1956.

4. "Mao Tszedun syuan'tszi," Dunbey shudyan', 1948, pp 205-232.

5. RENMIN RIBAO 31 October 1978.

6. Ibid., 9 October 1969.

7. Ibid., 10 August 1961.

8. LISHI YANJIU No 3, 1962.

9. GUANGMING RIBAO 9 September 1979.

10. UNEN 30 November 1979.

11. NOVOSTI MONGOLII 28 December 1979.

12. RENMIN RIBAO 5 November 1966.

13. See M.S. Kapitsa, "KNR: tri desyatiletiya--tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades--Three Polices], Moscow, 1979, p 388.

14. A.D. Barnett, "China and the Major Powers in East Asia," Washington, 1977, p 323.

15. RENMIN RIBAO 15 March 1977.

16. M.S. Kapitsa, op. cit., p 270.

17. PRAVDA 5 April 1979.

18. RENMIN RIBAO 25 January, 19 June 1980.

19. WASHINGTON POST 1 March 1972.

20. NHAN DAN 19 June 1975.

21. RENMIN RIBAO 29 December 1977.

22. NHAN DAN 7 March 1979.

23. See PRAVDA 8 March 1979.

24. A.I. Dinkevich, "The Law of the Inequality of Social Development," NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA No 6, 1979.

25. RENMIN RIBAO 11 April 1974.

26. Ibid., 1 November 1977.

27. "Dragon and Eagle. United States-China Relations; Past and Future," New York, 1977, p 20.

28. GRANMA 27 January 1976.

29. RENMIN RIBAO 15 July 1978.

30. Ibid., 4 August 1977.

31. NEW YORK TIMES 28 January 1980.

32. RENMIN RIBAO 9 February 1979.

33. PRAVDA 15 April 1980.

34. "Mao Tszedun sysyan van' suy," p 106.

35. RENMIN RIBAO 28 August 1977.

36. Doc. UN A/C.1/32/PV.47 of 29 November 1977, p 16; RENMIN RIBAO 1 November 1977.

37. RENMIN RIBAO 1 January 1980.

38. HONGQI, July 1977.

39. RENMIN RIBAO 24 November 1977.

40. Ibid., 22, 23, 27 February 1980.

41. Ibid., 18 July 1972.

42. UN Doc. A/32/PV.13 of 30 September 1977, p 53.

43. RENMIN RIBAO 25 November 1971.

44. RENMIN RIBAO 5 October 1972; UN Doc. A/C.1/31/PV.43 of 26 November 1976, pp 44-45; A/C.1/32/PV.47 of 29 November 1977, p 13.

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67. YOMIURI 30 May 1980.

68. NEW STATESMAN 26 October 1979.

69. PRAVDA 24 June 1980.

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U.S. BACKING FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM EXAMINED

Moscow NOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW in English 3 Feb 81 pp 1-3

[Article by Spartak Beglov, NOVOSTI political correspondent: "International Terrorism Traceable to Washington"]

[Text] When the new US Secretary of State Alexander Haig attempted to blame the Soviet Union at his first news conference for "encouraging international terrorism," he must have been little mindful of the far-reaching consequences of his own pronouncements. It is not only that there was no ground whatsoever to support Washington's efforts to ascribe to the Soviet Union the things it had never done and the philosophy it had never preached. Acts of terror, encroachments on life and property and secret conspiracies had been excluded forever from the arsenal of Soviet foreign policy by its very founder, Vladimir Lenin.

But once some men in Washington have chosen to talk about "international terrorism" as an unacceptable and disgusting method of state policy, a method of armed violence and secret conspiracies, the sponsors of this imprudent "new opening" must know that they are treading on thin ice. It is bound to go right away under the weight of fresh memory millions in all continents have of an unending chain of coups, political assassinations and dictatorial regimes implanted by the United States.

As estimated by the Brooking Institution, during 1945-1975 the US used armed force or threatened force in an attempt to impose its will on other nations 215 times. These do not comprise the latest instances of the use of force or mercenaries against the new regimes in Angola, Nicaragua and Iran.

The record of the American "intelligence community" is particularly ominous: it is one of an interminable tangle of conspiracies, coups, political assassinations, which has never been unravelled in full by the Senate Select Committee to investigate CIA activities which met in the mid-seventies. The suppression of the democratic movement in Guatemala in 1956, the overthrow of the Mossadeq government in Iran in 1953 bringing in its train a long period of bloodshed in Iranian history when hundreds of thousands of people, killed or crippled by torture, fell victim to the secret SAVAK police, the CIA's pet. Next it was Guatemala again in the focus of the CIA's attention, followed by Argentina and then the Dominican Republic. Then came a concentrated effort in 1950 to stage conspiracies against Cuba: the abortive CIA invasion of the Bay of Pigs and a multi-stage plan to plot the assassination of Fidel Castro. Africa was being turned into a scene of

CIA operations at the same time: the treacherous murder of Patrice Lumumba, the conspiracies in Ghana and a number of other states of the Bay of Guinea. Also at the same time the "intelligence community" undertook close surveillance of South-East Asia: the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in 1963 was the prelude to a full-scale war of extermination against the patriots of the three countries of Indochina. "Napalm terror" was the Pentagon's contribution to the history of punitive wars, and a no less disgraceful act of American diplomacy in aiding and abetting mass terror: support at the UN for the regime of Pol Pot, the hangman who annihilated three million of his compatriots in Cambodia.

In the meantime, the organisers of real, not imaginery, international terrorism, with headquarters at Langley, Virginia, USA, went on stabbing in the back legitimate governments in the name of so-called American "vital interests": in 1967 in Greece condemned to a ten-year rule of a sinister dictatorship of "black colonels," in 1973 in Chile which fell under a CIA-sponsored reign of terror. Any people can at any time find themselves at gunpoint in a CIA-organised "destabilising" operation. When agents and frontmen bought for dollars fail, it is the bands of terrorists, disguised as "resistance groups," that are brought into action as they have been in Afghanistan.

A brief commentary is too short to enumerate all that could not be mentioned in all the many volumes of commissions of inquiry and the revelations in the memoirs of former spies, or to spell out in every ominous detail the history of "international terrorism" which has been made a point of US state policy after the last war. To do this is superhuman for the time being.

But let us turn back to the consequences of the imprudent opening of the new men in Washington. For, after all, it is not at the Soviet Union alone that they aimed in the long run. Our country can stand up for itself. But the attempts of the new administration's ideologues to assert their self-styled "right" to express their arrogant and insulting judgements of other governments and political movements betrays something more than a neglect of the common standards of international relations. This deliberate rejection of the choice of other peoples implies the same concept of "legitimacy" and "illegitimacy" which was followed by the "Holy Alliance" of reactionary monarchs of Europe in the early 19th century when they divided political regimes into "lawful" and "unlawful" in a bid to justify armed intervention in the affairs of other nations. And now we see Ronald Reagan, in an interview for the Italian SETTIMANALE weekly on January 20, tagging the labels of "lawlessness," "crimes," "terrorism" all over the world's map as easily as if one in every two nations or social movements deserved to be "blacklisted" by the White House.

The Arab people of Palestine are, of course, among those at the top of that list, just because they demand the restoration of their most arrogantly trampled right to their own native land, their own national home. The same "crime" has been attributed to the Arab governments who are behind the Palestinians. Next come the peoples of Cuba and Nicaragua, the fighting patriots and democrats of El Salvador, the people of Angola and Ethiopia, and, of course, all the 36 million Iranians who have what the White House terms as a handful of "vulgar pirates," not a government, at their head. And then, in the same rank, the Communist

Parties of Western Europe with their "criminal" allegiance to the idea of scientific socialism and the interests of the working class.

In fact, not even the Social Democrats, members of the Socialist International, can any longer avoid being "blacklisted" by Washington either. Just because they expressed their solidarity with the people of Nicaragua at their recent Congress and declared themselves against American intervention in El Salvador and for progress towards disarmament. Nor, indeed, the social democratic governments of Western Europe for having spoken up in favour of meeting the legitimate demands of the Palestinians.

If the so-called "new opening" in Washington does not herald anything but a resumption of the bad old Cold War, the international community will have the right to remind the American Establishment how glaringly this contradicts the modern tenor of world politics as well as the alignment of forces and priorities of the eighties.

(APN, February 2. In full.)

CSO: 1812

BRIEFS

PRC BALKAN POLICY--Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 17 January 1981 carries on pages 2-3 a 3,000-word article by international affairs journalist F. Angeli entitled "Beijing: A Perfidious and Inflammatory Policy." The article, published under the rubric "Aiding the Propagandist," contains the following passage: "The Maoists' incursion into Balkan history is yet another 'scientific' means of making attempt after attempt to sow enmity toward the USSR in the Balkans. As is known, this was the purpose of Hua Guofeng's Balkan trip in August 1978. Beijing's strategic mission in relations with the socialist states remains unchanged--it is to undermine their unity and cohesion, cause discord among them, set them against the Soviet Union, upset the coordination of their actions in the international arena and, ultimately, subject them to its influence. It was for this purpose that Chinese diplomacy adopted the 'differentiated approach.' Beijing commits overt and aggressive acts against some countries, threatens others with military actions or brings diplomatic and economic pressure to bear on them; toward yet others it displays 'amicability.' This is a perfidious and inflammatory policy." [Editorial report]

U.S. INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR--Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 January 1981 publishes on page 3, under the headline "El Salvador: Soldiers Had Rifles and Death Lists..." the 1,000-word first part of a 2-part article by Yu. Stroyev on the situation in El Salvador. The author begins by describing U.S. influence in Latin America as a whole and then specifically in El Salvador through the dictatorships of Martinez and Romero to the present junta seeing it aiming constantly at suppressing the national liberation movement. Aid from the United States has been used "to buy weapons to kill patriots," he says, and "that country is prepared for direct military intervention." The 1,800-word second part of the article, published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 15 January on page 3, describes events since November 1980. The situation of violence and confusion is seen as giving the United States a pretext for further intervention, including making changes in the ruling junta. The United States is seen to be "alarmed" by "patriots'" victories against intervening forces from Guatemala and Honduras, to which it has reacted by resuming military aid to El Salvador. The author concludes by wondering how President Reagan will approach El Salvador. [Editorial report]

CSO: 1807

NATIONAL

SOCIOLOGY INSTITUTE POLLS READER OPINION OF SOVIET PRESS

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by V. Koroheynikov, head of public opinion section at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Audience Needs"]

[Text] A significant place is occupied in the draft of the Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of our country, which we are now comprehensively discussing, by questions of raising the creative activity of workers. This is quite natural as the fulfillment of the task of the 11th Five-Year Plan formulated in the document--sharp rise of production efficiency, the placing of all reserves at the service of the national economy cannot be done without the inculcation of enterprise, responsibility and initiative in people. There is no doubt that a significant role in this most important and multifaceted task is bound to be played by our press, which V.I. Lenin called a collective organizer, agitator and propagandist. Newspapers and journals in addition to the function of information also have today a constantly growing educational and ideological function; their influence on readers is becoming more and more marked. But does the press always take into consideration the needs of its audience and is the relation between the subject matter of printed publications and the concrete concerns of people dictated by life always stable and reliable?

Specialization Is Needed Everywhere

Once a friend phoned me and proposed going to a concert at the Ostankinskiy Television Center. "Do they give performances for the public?" I asked in surprise. "They will make a recording on video film, which will later be shown over television. In order to create at the concert more of a "contact" atmosphere, the television studio naturally invites not only performers but also viewers," my companion explained.

I must admit, however, that such a situation in the work of mass information media does not occur very often. The more usual process is one in which the source of information and the audience are separated both in time and in space. But the main thing remains is that they are united by real life in all its forms and

manifestations. And the better a propagandist feels the pulse of life and takes it into account in his activities, the more effective is his influence on the thoughts and feelings of people.

At each historical stage, this task requires its own unique solution. It is necessary but difficult to find it since it contains the key to overcoming those weaknesses in the staging of our informational, ideological and educational activities as pointed out in a recent decree of the CPSU Central Committee on improving ideological work.

The party has pointed out the principal ways of upgrading quality and efficiency of propagandistic, educational work--ensuring of a high scientific level, relation to life and the solution of economic and political tasks and development of aggressiveness. And now the problem lies in the concrete embodiment of these requirements in our ideological practice.

It can be said with confidence that the Soviet Union holds leading positions in the world in regard to the possession of mass information media and the use of their materials by the population. The country's "newspaper division" alone includes 29 central, 153 republic, 370 kray and oblast, more than 3,500 okrug, city and rayon and about 4,000 small-circulation newspapers. The country's population has more than 70 million television sets and almost as many radio receivers and about 74 million radio broadcasting stations.

As shown by the research conducted by the public opinion section of the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the audience of mass information media consists of about 90 percent of the adult (older than 16 years of age) population of the country. The overwhelming majority of Soviet people use the complex of mass information channels, that is, the reading of newspapers and journals is supplemented by looking at television programs and listening to radio broadcasts. There is a clearly traced tendency for regularity of contacts with the mass media. This is reflected, for example, in growth of subscriptions to periodical publications. Thus, according to the data of research conducted in Moscow this spring, each family on the average subscribes to two newspapers and 2.6 journal publications.

We thus see, on the one hand, the tremendous possibilities of our system of mass information and, on the other, the constantly growing interest of the population in the communications of the press, radio and television. At the same time, we are often hypnotized in the old way by purely quantitative indicators. It is good, for example, that we have many large-circulation newspapers and journals (there are more than 8,000 newspapers published in the USSR with 173 million copies issued at one time and 5,265 journal publications with more than 200 million copies issued at one time.) But the indicators of the "swell" are too one-sided.

Over the years of the Soviet power a rather harmonious network of newspapers and journals has been created in our country according to administrative-territorial breakdown (from central party, soviet and komsomol organs to rayon ones), according to occupational breakdown (for example, MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA, SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA) and according to social-demographic breakdown (such as SEL'SKAYA MOLODEZH'). But life does not stay in place. The dynamic character of social-economic processes and the spiritual life of our society demand the constant improvement of the system of mass information media and its thematic structure.

Let us take, for example, such a topical problem of our existence as the use of free time, the amount of which at the present time is quite large. The growth of our free time requires, in our view, a sharp increase in the number of colorfully illustrated publications of the type of "Our House," "Garden and City," "Games and Diversions," oriented toward the satisfaction of different interests of people.

Let us touch upon another question. We know that in the demographic structure of the population of the USSR, the number of elderly people is increasing; the country now has about 47 million pensioners. Their specific informational interests are practically not reflected in the structure of our press. It is possible to quote a number of such examples. But on the other hand, the list of press organs includes many publications that actually duplicate each other.

More Burning Problems of the Day

Big opportunities for boosting the quality and efficiency of ideological work are to be found by drawing closer to the demands of life, to the needs of the audience with the content of the materials of newspapers and journals, radio and TV. Sociological research shows that, say, problems of morality, morale and education occupy one of the first places in the hierarchy of people's interests. Readers, listeners and viewers are particularly drawn to materials dealing with interrelations in a labor collective, in the family, among neighbors in the house and the courtyard. Such a situation undoubtedly must be taken into account in our propaganda work. The purpose is not to reduce all diverse information to moral problems but to illumine the events of our life in their moral aspect as well.

Moral problems are directly connected to the struggle against negative manifestations in our life. Our audience shows much interest in information of this kind. Thus, during a study of the needs of readers of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 64 percent of the persons interviewed stated that the newspaper should write more in a critical vein, first, about drunkenness, thievery and amoral behavior and, second, about defects in the upbringing of children and teenagers in the family and school. Thirty-six percent of the subscribers to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA sense a need for increased criticism of deficiencies in planning and management at enterprises (mismanagement, crash work, defective work, low labor and production discipline, formalism in the organization of socialist competition). Readers propose not just a simple statement of the existence of these or those defects but an analysis as well of the conditions of their appearance and the disclosing in this connection of unworthy behavior on the part of directors and officials.

The high level of social-political activity of our population and its historical experience is reflected in increased use of information on the international situation. The public opinion surveys we have carried out show that the Soviet people unanimously support the unceasing struggle of our party for peace, detente and cessation of the arms race. Information on the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries attracts great attention of our people. At the same time, they want to know more about life in foreign countries, especially in socialist countries. As shown by the studies, readers, listeners and viewers would like to obtain fuller information on such aspects of the life of socialist countries as culture, art, literature, agriculture, health care, the service sphere, recreation, everyday life and morals of the population. All this demonstrates the breadth of the interests of our people, their deep concerns for the most diverse aspects of real life.

With Consideration of Social Psychology

The dynamic character of the processes of development of Soviet society demands constant and careful consideration of currently newly arising factors in information-propaganda work. Take, for example, the question of such social-demographic characteristics of the audience of propaganda media as education, sex and age. It has been shown repeatedly that educational level is one of the decisive factors determining the structure of interests and scope of used articles. At the same time, as was justly stated in the decree of the Central Committee of the party on ideological work, the quality of our informational activity does not always meet the growing educational and cultural level of Soviet people. The following consideration should be kept in mind. Thanks to universal secondary education and a wide-ranging system of VUZ's, the general level of education in the USSR is being constantly equalized and this results in a relative growth of the role of certain other social-demographic factors.

Our researches show, for example, a rather marked difference in thematic preferences and volumes of used information of men and women with the same level of education. For example, how especially "feminine" can such themes as culture, art, literature and questions of health care be called.

Such a high level of attention to newspaper publications brings higher demands on them. If we were to speak of quality and diversity of articles, we would probably find that the "weakest spot" here is duplication of information. In the course of research, about 90 percent of those surveyed noted that one finds in published materials the same, repeated information. Of course, a certain amount of repetition of subject matter is clearly inevitable (the same fragments of life are dealt with), but narrowness of problems, textual repetitions manifestly reduce the propaganda effect.

The present period is characterized by a sharply exacerbated ideological struggle in the international arena. A certain place is occupied in the informational flow circulating in our society by articles that are inimical to us, disinformation materials of various anti-Soviet and antisocialist "voices."

Our ideological adversaries have themselves repeatedly acknowledged that, despite tremendous expenditures, they are unable to achieve any significant results in their anticommunist aims. The most that they are able to achieve, in their own opinion, is to inspire among some unstable people various rumors, false news and the like. But we should not provide even such a miserly chance to the enemies of socialism. Here it would be hardly possible to have a "special prescription" exclusively intended for counteracting hostile ideological influence. The principal way of solving this and other problems of forming a harmonious, spiritually rich personality in the Soviet man, alien to the notorious "ideals" of imperialist propaganda, is to deepen attention toward current problems, growth of effectiveness, system and aggressiveness of character in the operation of our mass information media.

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CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS OBSERVE SOVIET MILITIA DAY

Kirghiz SSR

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 8 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by Kirghiz SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Major General of Internal Service A. Gabidulin: "Always at Their Post"]

[Text] The Soviet militia is commemorating its traditional holiday in an atmosphere of political and labor enthusiasm elicited by preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress. Decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and of the Fourth Session, 10th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet have entered our lives as a program of great achievements for the good of the people. The results have been summarized, and new targets have been indicated. The party and Soviet government devoted their main attention to problems upon which the welfare of the Soviet people depends.

Growth in the effectiveness of the national economy and intensification of all social production in an effort to raise the welfare of the people would be unimaginable without high state and social discipline, sound socialist law and order, and active eradication of former evils alien to socialism, of manifestations of private ownership psychology, money-grubbing, bourgeois thinking, parasitism, and their extreme expression--crime.

Implementing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Improving Protection of Law and Order and Intensifying the Fight Against Crime", internal affairs organs of the Kirghiz SSR have implemented concrete measures to improve organization and raise discipline and responsibility in all areas of their work. The principal militia services have been reinforced, and more equipment has been provided to their subdivisions. A new system of militia control has been created, based on the latest achievements of science in this area. The patrol post service, the patrol subdivisions, and the "02" service have been strengthened.

Crime prevention has become a large part of the work of the Kirghiz militia in recent years. Militia workers rely in this effort upon the active support of laborers, white collar workers, and students.

As of today, there are 431 public law enforcement points staffed by more than 6,000 active members in the republic. There are 1,125 crime prevention councils in the labor collectives, and more than 97,000 detachment volunteers.

Many good and kind words can be directed toward volunteer peoples detachments of the Mayli-Say Electronic Tube Plant, the Dzhalal-Abad Plug Connection Plant, the Frunzenskaya TETs, and the Kirgizpoligraf Combine, and detachment volunteers of Tokmak and Rybach'ye. Together with militia workers, they have detected and halted a significant number of crimes and cases of hooliganism and misappropriation of state and personal property.

Order in the streets and public places has been strengthened in the republic with the participation of our voluntary helpers, and the struggle against drunkenness, parasitism, hooliganism, and other law violations has been intensified. Fewer crimes are now being committed in the streets and in other public places, especially by juveniles. Purposeful work is being done to fight mismanagement and various abuses.

However, the tasks facing the internal affairs organs and the militia are not being completed fully in all respects. There is much to do to make their activities comply with the requirements of the times. Interaction of the militia with the public in the fight against hooliganism and drunkenness, which give cause to many types of especially dangerous crimes, requires significant improvement. The activity and aggressiveness of the actions of the militiamen themselves in crime prevention must be raised, and they must insure the inevitability of punishment for those who transgress upon legally protected interests of the society and state.

The party and government as well as all Soviet people have imposed high responsibility upon our peoples militia. In the 63 years of its history, it has traveled a heroic path. Born in the October Revolution , the Soviet militia holds faithfulness to the commandments of the great Lenin sacred, it is wholly devoted to the ideals of the Communist Party, and it is watchfully standing guard over the interests of the people.

Our country is marching toward a new landmark in its history--the 26th CPSU Congress. The Soviet people will have great and complex tasks in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Colleagues of the Soviet militia fully recognize their role in successful completion of these tasks, and as always, they are prepared to perform their combat duty.

Tajik SSR

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 8 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Tajik SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Major General of Internal Service I. Kurbanov: "Standing Guard Over the Interests of the People"]

[Text] The history of the Soviet militia's creation is inseparably associated with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Instituted by Lenin in a decree adopted on the third day following the historic volley of the "Aurora", the Soviet militia added glorious pages to the chronicle of the socialist motherland. Its road was marked by heroism in the civil war, unexcelled valor in reinforcement of law and order and socialist legality, and heroism on the battlefields of the grim years of the Great Patriotic War.

Prominent officials of the Leninist party--F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, M. I. Kalinin, M. V. Frunze, K. Ye. Voroshilov, the first peoples commissar of internal affairs G. I. Petrovskiy, and many others helped to organize the first revolutionary detachments of the workers and peasants militia.

The militia of the young Tajik Soviet Republic formed in the difficult conditions of a class struggle. The names of its first organizers--A. Yarmukhamedov, F. Izhevskiy, N. Pavlinskiy, I. Nabiyev, B. Sadykov, M. Aminov, Sh. Yusupov, N. Vegel, B. Gayurov, and K. Sardarov--will remain in the people's memory forever.

Since the first days of its organization, the main task of the Tajik militia has been to protect the achievements of Great October, socialist property, and public order. Workers of the republic's internal affairs organs have always felt a sense of high responsibility for this great mission, and they still feel it today.

In recent years, owing to the untiring concern of the Communist Party and Soviet government, significant qualitative changes have occurred in the militia organs. Today the overwhelming majority of the colleagues of the law enforcement service have a higher and special education, and they have received good occupational training. Many of them came to work in militia organs on recommendation of party and Komsomol organizations, or at the request of labor collectives. The material-technical base has been significantly reinforced as well. And what is most important is that the tie of the Soviet militia with the people has grown closer. The people view the militia as a dependable guard and protector of national interests.

Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Tajik SSR, and the CPSU Central Committee decrees "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" and "On Improving Protection of Law and Order and Intensifying the Fight Against Crime" have become the compass for our daily practical activities. Guiding themselves by these documents, workers of the militia will continue to improve their occupational skill and their activities aimed at protecting the interests of the state and the rights, honor, and merit of citizens.

The guards of order hold sacred and multiply the traditions born of the years of revolutionary transformations. They are faithful to the memory of those who gave their lives in the struggle for establishment of Soviet rule in the republic, and on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar era of peace. The names of the chief of the political section of the Kulyab district militia Aleksandr Sorkin, chief of the Khodzhentskiy district and city militia Kutbiddin Nazhmitdinov, militiamen Nizam Norov, Sharif Shodyyev, and many others have been inscribed in gold letters in the chronicle of the Tajik militia.

Today's veterans of the law enforcement service--M. D. Dzhonov, N. K. Yakh"yayev, K. Kh. Khabilov, I. N. Mokrushin, Sh. Nazarshoyev, Ya. S. Motylev, and others--are continuing their work honorably. The young police generation is standing guard over the laws together with the veterans, learning from their experience and skill. This year many Komsomol members who adopted stiffer socialist pledges achieved outstanding results in crime prevention. The best were photographed beside the Red Banner of the republic's Komsomol organization. They included

R. Karimov from the OVD [Internal Affairs Administration] of the Leninabad City Executive Committee, R. Kakharov from the OVD of the Chkalov City Executive Committee, and dozens of others.

A course toward extensive social crime prevention is being followed in the republic in accordance with party decisions. The main direction here is further reinforcement of interaction between the militia and public organizations. The republic now has more than 60,000 detachment volunteers and 3,000 members in the Komsomol operational detachments; there are more than 2,000 crime prevention councils and over 200 public law enforcement posts.

Recently the minister of internal affairs of the Tajik SSR presented awards to S. V. Kulagin, a milling machine operator at the Dushanbe "Tadzhiktekstil'mash" plant imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, T. N. Borzikov, assistant chairman of the Komsomol committee of the Tajik State Medical Institute imeni Abuali ibn Sino, and others for their active participation in crime prevention among young people and juveniles.

Unofficial colleagues of the State Motor Vehicle Inspection, public motor vehicle inspectors, and members of specialized voluntary detachments are rendering considerable assistance in the prevention of traffic accidents. They include M. Ismailov, a garage director at the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin of Proletarskiy Rayon, B. Karimov, a driver of the Goskomsel'khoztekhnika Association of Kuybyshevskiy Rayon, R. Zabirov, a driver of the Vakhsh Motor Vehicle Base No 3 of the Ministry of Motor Transport, and many others.

The council of the public law enforcement post of the capital's 63d microdistrict is providing invaluable assistance to the internal affairs organs in law enforcement. Great credit for this belongs to the council chairman, chief of Motor Vehicle Base No 1 of the republic's Ministry of Construction Yu. R. Agamirov. The crime prevention efforts of the public law enforcement post in the 46th microdistrict is well organized as well.

Voluntary peoples detachments are actively participating in law enforcement. I would like to make special mention today of the real enthusiasm displayed by the following militia volunteers: G. Bykov, milling machine operator of the "Metalloplastmassy" Association; A. N. Broyber, a shop chief of the same enterprise; A. I. Iskandarov, commander of a voluntary peoples detachment of the "Tadzhikmaslo" Association, and others.

Displaying high exactingness, at the same time the party and government show constant concern for improving the activities of all law enforcement organs and staffing them with qualified personnel.

A socialist competition for an honorable welcome to the 26th CPSU Congress has assumed broad scope in every labor collective in the republic. Responding to the constant concern of the party and government for raising their standard of living, the Soviet people are trying to make a worthy contribution to successful implementation of the five-year program. Together with all the people, our Soviet militia is also preparing to honorably greet the forthcoming forum of the country's communists. Protection of the interests of the state and people is at the forefront of its struggle.

Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by Kazakh SSR Minister of Internal Affairs A. Platayev: "Together With the People"]

[Text] The laborers of our country are commemorating the Day of the Soviet Militia, created 63 years ago on V. I. Lenin's initiative. Defining the task of this organ, which was created to protect the achievements of the revolution, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin stated: "The militia must have a direct tie with the laborers...it should rely in its activities on honest people interested in maintaining order in Soviet society. The militia is a servant of the people, and without the support of the laborers it will not be able to perform the tasks given to it."

Following these commandments of the great leader, Soviet militia organs are constantly strengthening their tie with the broad laboring masses, they are filling their ranks with the best laborers and white collar workers, and they are indoctrinating them in the spirit of faithfulness to duty and the law. The remarkable qualities of the guards of order and champions of communist morality are gaining their maturity in their daily activity of strengthening social order and fighting against crime.

Party and state officials of the republic--A. Dazhangil'din, A. Aytiyev, K. Sarymuldiyev, N. Nurmakov, M. Masanchi, and others--made a significant contribution to formation of Kazakhstan's militia in the first years of the Soviet rule. The republic's young militia selflessly assumed guard over the government of the people, and it destroyed White Guards, Basmatch, and Alashordynets detachments. Many glorious Kazakh militiamen died in the mortal struggle with the enemy. Among them were Communist N. Dikopol'skiy from the village of Dolon', Semipalatinskaya Oblast, deputy chief of the Vernenskiy district militia B. Orazbakiyev, chief of the Gur'yev district militia Comrade Chingisov, militiamen of the Ural'sk militia Comrade Makhmutov, Undasynov, Bakhtirov, Popov, and Chernov, and others.

Comrade D. A. Kunayev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Kazakh SSR Communist Party Central Committee, said during the days of celebration dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Kazakh SSR and the Kazakh SSR Communist Party that we will always remember those who affirmed the new way of life on Kazakh soil in the revolutionary years and the civil war with rifles, plows, and primers, and displayed class consciousness and solidarity, high international qualities, steadfastness, bravery, and heroism.

These penetrating words apply fully to the warriors of our republic's workers and peasants militia, workers whose names have been inscribed in gold letters in the chronicle of the struggle for the glorious ideals of our society.

Thousands of Kazakh militia workers valorously fought with the hated enemy during the Great Patriotic War as well. "I am proud that I have been given the honor to serve the motherland on the front lines of the Great Patriotic War. I will die, but I will do so with the awareness that our children and grandsons and our fathers and mothers will live in liberty"--this is what was written by G. I. Averkin, a former worker of the Kazakh militia and a political worker of one of the subunits of the Panfilov Division.

The militia has always performed complex and important tasks that have changed in form depending on the particular stage of the Soviet state's development. But its main task has remained constant: sacredly protecting the interests of the people and state, and standing an alert guard over socialist legality.

In recent years the party and government have adopted a number of important measures to improve the work of law enforcement organs. Tremendous attention is being devoted to the personnel of the internal affairs organs and their most important element--the Soviet militia. The militia has been joined by many young workers who are learning from the glorious traditions of the veterans in the spirit of communist conviction, high professionalism, moral purity, faithfulness to duty, high alertness, and trust in the people.

In its decree "On Improving Protection of Law and Order and Intensifying the Fight Against Crime", the CPSU Central Committee ordered law enforcement organs to fight crime resolutely and without compromise, and to develop and strengthen the ties with labor collectives and the public. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev indicated that the party expects even greater initiative, adherence to principles, and intolerability in the fight against all violations of law and order from the law enforcement organs.

These statements are a program of action for the militia organs. Its workers are putting their all into this effort.

In recent years special communications equipment has been introduced at a swift rate in order to protect socialist and personal property. The availability of equipment to subdivisions of the State Motor Vehicle Inspection is being constantly improved. Militia workers now have helicopters, computers, and industrial television at their disposal.

Much attention is being devoted to assimilating new and advanced forms and methods of work. One such form is the mobile militia posts. Buses bearing the letters PPM [Mobile Militia Post] have appeared on the streets of Alma-Ata and of all of the republic's oblast centers. They are successfully fighting crime. The appearance alone of these posts at the places where laborers spend their leisure time, in parks, and in other populated areas is enough to have a sobering action upon hooligans or drunks.

However, the people of the militia still play the decisive role in the fight against crime. The number of remarkable people capable of performing the most complex missions has grown in the ranks of the Kazakh militia.

At the request of the party, the labor collectives of the industrial enterprises and institutions are sending their best representatives to work in the internal affairs organs. For the most part these are communists and Komsomol members who have a great desire to assimilate the work of the militia and achieve high indicators in their service. They are politically mature, competent, disciplined people.

The militiaman often encounters the worst side of human relationships, and he must deal with hooligans and drunkards. Despite this, he must display constant restraint

and benevolence in relation to citizens, he must have a clear knowledge of his responsibilities, and he must know how to penetrate into the psychology of people and serve as a model in following the law. These are what make up the daily routine of the militia.

Recently three armed criminals robbed a store in the town of Novo-Kazalinsk. Relying on the help of citizens, an operational group consisting of Senior Lieutenant of Militia A. Zhurmanbetov, Senior Lieutenant of Militia Ye. Zhaymanov, and Sergeant of Militia R. Aliyev caught and arrested the hardened recidivist criminals on that same day.

Many of the ministry's collectives are enjoying significant successes in their work. Thus the winners of the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Kazakh SSR and the Kazakh SSR Communist Party included the collectives of the Buyneuskiy ROVD [Rayon Internal Affairs Division] of Mangyshlakskaya Oblast, Yermakovskiy ROVD of Pavlodarskaya Oblast, Sovetskiy ROVD of Severo-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast, Kirovskiy ROVD of Taldy-Kurganskaya Oblast, the Kzyl-Orda City Internal Affairs Division, and others.

A mass competition for an honorable welcome to the 26th CPSU Congress has been initiated in these days of celebration. This competition was initiated by collectives of the Leninogorsk City Internal Affairs Division, the extradepartmental law enforcement division of the internal affairs administration of the Alma-Ata City Executive Committee, and the internal affairs division of Zashchita Station of Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast. True masters of militia service are laboring in these and other collectives. Many of them have earned the "Best in the Profession" title. They include section inspectors P. Bondar', Ye. Utesinov, and A. Izbaskanov, senior state motor vehicle inspector A. Kayer, senior inspectors of the highway patrol service T. Tyapukhina and R. Orazalin, chief of the passport office Yu. Orazbayev, and senior examining magistrate A. Baygashev.

Militia workers made their contribution to Kazakhstan's grain harvest. They maintained order on the grain traffic routes, they intervened against attempts at misappropriation of the grain, and they protected the grain fields, threshing floors, and elevators from fires.

The Soviet militia subordinates all of its work to the interests of the people and the Soviet state. It is doing its job with reliance on the constant assistance and support of the people, and it is in this that its strength lies.

Voluntary peoples detachments, which contain 14,000 participants, have become active helpers of the militia. The public is working actively at law enforcement posts, in the crime prevention councilsof the labor collectives, in comrades courts, and in commissions set up by executive committees of the local soviets of peoples deputies.

We are deeply grateful to the labor collectives and social organizations--all who have stood guard over law and order and who are now participating in moral indoctrination of the citizens hand-in-hand with colleagues of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the plenum, and the materials of the Fourth Session, 10th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet spelled out major tasks for the republic's internal affairs organs. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's statements and demands concerning an attentive and concerned attitude toward the individual, and intolerance of red tape, pretentiousness, and callousness have a direct bearing on the work of the militia, since it is a state organ to which every Soviet citizen must turn at one time or another.

The internal affairs organs of the republic must significantly improve their activities if they are to decisively fight mismanagement, strengthen labor discipline, and increase the productivity of agricultural production. The "Fundamental Principles of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Administrative Law Violations" adopted by the Fourth Session, 10th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet will promote further reinforcement of socialist legality and law enforcement in our country.

Inspired by the historic documents of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, militia workers are fully resolved to successively improve their activities and to welcome the 26th CPSU Congress with new successes in reinforcing law and order.

Turkmen SSR

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 11 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Turkmen SSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs P. Voly'khin: "On Guard Over Order"]

[Text] We are nearing the end of the last year of the 10th Five-Year Plan, marked by new successes in development of communist society. Workers of the militia organs are making their contribution to this national effort.

Formation and development of the Soviet militia are inseparably associated with the name of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. The road that has been traveled by the Soviet militia serves as an example of practical implementation of Lenin's mortal ideals in the area of state control, organization of the fight against crime, and protection of public order.

A significant number of emissaries from the labor collectives join the militia organs every year. In what manner does their work begin? It all depends mainly on the young colleagues themselves. They must clearly understand that the working place of the militia is far from the station offices. Their place is wherever persistent effort is required to maintain compliance with the law and the requirements of justice, and to preserve the peaceful life of the Soviet citizen. Their workplace is the populated streets of our cities, the platforms of our transportation terminals, and other public places. The workplace of the militiaman is wherever he is needed, wherever he can prevent crime and help the individual, sometimes risking his own health and life.

Our militia contains many workers who honorably and conscientiously perform their duty to the motherland, and who know their job perfectly. Many militia colleagues have been awarded orders and medals of the Soviet union and the "Distinguished Militiaman" insignia for their faultless and lengthy service, for maintaining exemplary public order, and for displaying boldness, valor, and heroism. They include: B. Saryyev, deputy chief of the criminal investigation division of the internal affairs division of the Mary City Executive Committee; M. Makhmudov, section militia inspector of Kaakhninskiy Rayon, Ashkhabadskaya Oblast; A. Khodzhaniyazov, senior inspector for especially important affairs, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Criminal Investigation Administration; R. Rakhimov, senior inspector of the administration for combatting embezzlement of socialist property and speculation, Turkmen SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs; and others.

The name of Sh. N. Madainov, officer in charge of the internal affairs division of the Tashauz City Executive Committee, will remain in our memory forever. He was decorated post-mortem on 20 August 1980 by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet with the Order of the Red Star for bravery and selflessness displayed in the execution of his official duty.

In the struggle for the new man, our militia always senses the guiding hand and exacting attention of the party. The internal affairs organs gain their main strength from party leadership and from the support of the people.

In the last few years the Soviet militia and the internal affairs organs experienced major qualitative changes, and now they possess everything they need to perform their important missions. The organizational structure and administrative system of the internal affairs organs have been transformed. The material-technical base has been strengthened. Staffs, duty units, night militia, computers, and analysis and prediction have firmly entered the practice of their work. New services specialized in crime prevention and in carrying out punishment not involving imprisonment have been created.

Enjoying broad rights and responsibilities, organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs protect the safety of citizens and their property. They insure normal working, living, and resting conditions for them. The internal affairs organs are helpers in formation of the country's social situation.

The role of the internal affairs organs in indoctrination and in revealing and correcting the causes and conditions promoting law violations has risen in the conditions of mature socialism. In other words preventive work has become the principal direction in the fight against crime. Owing to this, broad possibilities are being opened up for intensifying the fight against crime and, moreover, with the most humanitarian resources and methods, which is in line with the requirements of developed socialist society. Marx wrote in his time: "The wise lawmaker will prevent crime, so that he would not be compelled to punish for crime."

In addition to the most important constitutional responsibilities of citizens--compliance with Soviet laws, respect for the rules of socialist community, honorable and conscientious labor--the following requirements have now been enacted as constitutional law: intolerance of antisocial acts, full cooperation with law enforcement agencies, elimination of misappropriations and waste of state and public

property, and concern for education of young children. It is our duty to utilize these possibilities to the fullest extent.

Valuing the activities of the militia highly, the party and government display constant concern for strengthening its authority and social prestige. In the last few years many important laws have been enacted that clearly define the responsibilities and rights of the Soviet militia and require further growth of the occupational level of its personnel, and provision of all of the equipment and communication resources the subdivisions need. A number of fundamental decisions have been adopted in an effort to increase the role of the public in crime prevention, and to improve protection of socialist property. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Improving Protection of Law and Order and Intensifying the Fight Against Crime" play a tremendous role in improving the work of internal affairs organs.

The Soviet people actively support all measures of the internal affairs organs aimed at establishing exemplary order, and they believe the fight against crime to be a matter of personal importance. Under the guidance of party and soviet organs, the activities of voluntary peoples detachments, comrades courts, crime prevention councils in labor collectives, public law enforcement points, and other social organizations have assumed broad scope.

Millions of the best representatives of the working class, the laboring peasantry, and the Soviet intelligentsia are devoting their strength and free time to fulfillment of social duty. They undergo a school of citizenship, comradeship, and courage in the peoples detachments.

There is not a single settlement, enterprise, institution, kolkhoz, or sovkhoz in the republic where these truly popular formations do not exist, voluntarily participating in the fight against crime. The voluntary detachments of Krasnovodsk's passenger transport enterprise and the "Ashkhabad", "Kommunist", and "Pobeda" kolkhozes of Maryyskaya Oblast have recommended themselves well. Voluntary detachments of Ashkhabadskaya Oblast's Kaakhkinskiy and Serakhskiy rayons are providing significant assistance to the frontier troops in protection of the state borders, for which many of them have been rewarded by the command of the frontier troops.

Public law enforcement points in residential microdistricts are making a major contribution to the common good. They have received a high evaluation from the Central Committee of our party. They create the most favorable conditions for joint active, constant influence upon persons leaning toward law violations on the part of militia workers and the Soviet public. Good work is being done by the public law enforcement points in Ashkabad's Proletarskiy and Sovetskiy rayons, in the Kolkhoz imeni XX Parts"yezda of Chardzhouskiy Rayon, and many others. As was mentioned earlier, the crime prevention councils in the labor collectives are playing a major role in reeducation of certain citizens. There are presently more than 1700 of them in the republic. Great is the authority of the best of them, located at the Glass Combine imeni V. I. Lenin, in the Ashkhabad Passenger Motor Vehicle Pool No 3004, in the "Turkmenkover" association, in the Mary "Shatlykgaznefteztroy" Trust, in the Bezmein Cement Plant, and in the Krasnovodsk Petroleum Refinery.

Thus the internal affairs organs are successfully completing their law enforcement tasks in close interaction with the public.

11004
CSO: 1800

STAVROPOL OFFICIAL ON RAYON INTERFARM TECHNICAL SERVICES

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by V. Kalashnikov, secretary of Stavropol'skiy CPSU Kraykom: "A Single Field Service"]

[Text] The draft of "Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period to 1990" refers to the need for continuing work on improving management of agriculture and the development of interfarm and agroindustrial associations for the purpose of boosting the efficiency of public production.

In this connection, that big organizational-management experiment which is being conducted in Stavropol'skiy Kray deserves our attention.

Initially, we created interfarm enterprises for mechanization of agriculture in one rayon--Krasnogvardeyskiy. But since April of this year all machines and mechanisms of kolkhozes, sovkhozesand the material-technical base of Sel'khoztekhnika in the kray were united into such subdivisions. Their collectives carried out spring and fall sowing and harvesting of grain and fodder crops, and the conclusion can now be made: the new form of cooperative use of equipment has well justified itself.

Today the busy days of harvest time come to mind. The initiators of socialist competition during the harvest and the workers of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon carried out the harvesting and threshing within scheduled periods. A total of 70 hours was required to stack the grain in rows over an area of 85,000 hectares, which took only ten days to be picked up. In Ipatovskiy Rayon, during the first phase of the harvest work, the average daily productivity of each reaper was 61.5 hectares--much higher than in past years. An unprecedented tempo was attained in Turkmenskiy Rayon. Here they mowed grain crops on an area of 78,000 hectares in six days and threshed it in ten.

The economic results of such mass shock work are enormous. We calculated that if the same results had been obtained in the kray as on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon, it would have been possible to save 48 million rubles on the mechanized work and in addition to save 20,000 tons of diesel fuel and to free 6,200 tractors and agricultural machinery costing a total of 49 million rubles. This is why, on assessing these possibilities, the kray CPSU committee decided to expand the limits of the experiment and to create similar associations in all the rayons. Today there are 33 interfarm enterprises operating in the Stavropol region. They have united the engineering service and the technical base of 450 kolkhozes and sovkhozes, as well as 33 enterprises of the rayon departments of Sel'khoztekhnika.

Interfarm enterprises are a new form of organization of the rural technical service which it would be useful for the heads of party and operational organs of other rayons of the republic to heed now during the period of discussion of the draft of the Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR. How is the work organized?

Let us take the structure of the first interfarm enterprise in the kray--the Krasnogvardeyskiy. The rayon department of Sel'khoztekhnika primarily served as its basis. Solving the problem of a repair base, it made it possible for kolkhozes and sovkhozes to save considerable funds. Cooperation made it possible to get by with a smaller number of machine tools and specialized equipment and to make fuller use of engineering and technical cadres. The sum of the share payments of the rayon Sel'khoztekhnika for the creation of interfarm enterprises amounted to 2.8 million rubles. This provides for the cost of a general workshop, a depot for repairing combines, a station and mobile facilities for servicing and refueling. All this, like the farm equipment, came under the control of the centralized dispatcher service created in the rayon.

The share of the farms is significantly larger--about 12 million rubles. But we should immediately state here that the equipment of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, in distinction to practice in the years of the machine-tractor stations, remains as their property. It operates on the fields of their farms and cannot be transferred without the consent of the kolkhoz or sovkhoz for work outside its limits. The creation of a central dispatcher service has one aim: improvement of the organizational and technical support of the machine-tractor pool and other machinery. In all of the 10 kolkhozes and three sovkhozes of the rayon, specialized branches of interfarm enterprises were established. all the tractors, grain combines, agricultural machines and tools, operating transport, general-purpose shops, service stations, petrofuel facilities, spare-part stores, mobile servicing and refueling facilities are concentrated here. At the same time the units of the interfarm enterprise were provided with additional means of technical support of the machine-tractor pool during the time of field work such as mobile refueling units, repair units, diagnostic facilities and mobile repair shops.

Cadres were united under a single management. Almost 400 engineering and technical personnel were so transferred. But the interfarm enterprise is based on principles of voluntarism. Its basic objectives are better operation of the machine-tractor pool, higher level of organization of its repair and maintenance. And this is the basis for increased production of agricultural output. For example, an opportunity has been provided for improved use of equipment on kolkhozes and sovkhozes where it is kept together in specialized departments. At this time, personnel of the agronomic services especially acutely face the problem of the care with which requisitions are made and of clear-cut organization of work, and this, incidentally, immediately reduced different kinds of empty runs; the creation of centralized refueling stations in place of a multitude of small ones has reduced fuel losses. Capital repairs at the specialized departments are now conducted on a different, better technically supplied basis by enterprises of the kray's Sel'khoztekhnika.

We especially emphasize the aim set before interfarm enterprises: assurance of better use of equipment belonging to shareholding farms, the achievement of higher production of agricultural output. Not profits, chasing of which at times drew various enterprises of Sel'khoztekhnika in a direction away from their basic task, but rather growth of production output of crops, animal husbandry and other sectors.

The obtained profits are now distributed among the participants of the interfarm enterprise in accordance with the shares of their contributions. The principle of cost accounting, which has been at the basis of the lump wage payments of machine operators, motivates all to obtain a high end result. All means both the machine operators, and kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers and the enterprises of Sel'-khoztekhnika and the agrochemical association.

But in no case are the ties of machine operators working in the specialized departments broken with their kolkhozes and sovkhozes. They remain full-fledged members and they have a common party organization; machine operators retain all the benefits established for kolkhoz members, workers and employees of sovkhozes. In the final analysis, we have become convinced, a more responsible attitude toward their labor and the land is created, and the possibility appears of working better than before.

We know that poor workers in a collective are created by poor organization of labor, lack of control and inadequate demands. We have noted that with the appearance of harvesting-transport complexes in Ipatovskiy Rayon lagging machine operators essentially no longer exist. Why? Because conditions were created for everybody for precise, highly productive work. At the same time, for example, personnel of Sel'khoztekhnika workshops have kept aloof from the innovation. This means that there must be created motivation for successful, fruitful work that would be common to all who labor in the countryside. We think that the appearance of interfarm enterprises now creates such a possibility.

Thus, we must be concerned first of all with the conditions for successful shock work and inculcate thereby the habit and need for such work. It turns out that before any decision, even outwardly especially concerned with management, educational problems arise. They are indissolubly related. Clarity of assignments, availability of spare parts, coordination of all the services--all this makes it possible to achieve a high productivity of labor. Under such conditions, discipline is strengthened and responsibility is higher for the collective's end result.

With the development of interfarm ties, major economic problems can be simultaneously solved. Today various mechanization facilities worth 600 million rubles exist on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the kray. Every year, new equipment valued at 100-130 million rubles is acquired and the technical level of machines and machinery is raised. By 1985, most Stavropol rayons will have 350-400 tractors of the type of T-150 and K-700. This motorized armada should be used at full capacity and at the same time circumspectly.

We believe that the creation of interfarm enterprises, which is promoted by the draft of "Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR," will make it possible in the new five-year plan to significantly raise the level of use of equipment at kolkhozes and sovkhozes, to boost labor productivity and to speed up solution of tasks of intensification of agricultural production.

7697
CSO: 1800

DIFFERING FORMS OF AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT IN BALTICS

Latvia: Rayon Agro-Industrial Association

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by V. Kleynberg, chairman of the Board of the Talsinskiy Rayon Agro-Industrial Association: "United Efforts to Ensure A Shock-Work Finish to the Five-Year Plan and A Worthy Greeting to the CPSU Congress!"]

[Text] Farmworkers of Talsinskiy Rayon are among those in the fore in the competition among Latvian stockraisers for exemplary livestock wintering and increased productiveness. They are coping successfully with the obligations assumed. The high results achieved here have been largely due to the labor cooperation among related enterprises, to unified management of agricultural production and the storage, processing and marketing of output.

It is just such a comprehensive approach that yields the desired results. I speak on this matter with confidence based on five years of experience by our rayon agro-industrial association (RAPO). It includes nine kolkhozes and five sovkhozes, a local State Sel'khoztekhnika Committee department, an interkolkhoz construction organization, a mobile mechanized column of the "Latvsel'khozspetsmontazh" trust and a mechanized water-management construction column. Also included is the Stendskaya Experimental Breeding Station of the Latvian Scientific Research Institute of Farming and Agricultural Economics. A dairy, packing plant, cannery and mixed feed plant became members of the association. All these kolkhozes and sovkhozes, enterprises and organizations have retained their own economic and legal independence, but the output production and marketing plans they carry out and the work schedules and quality are coordinated and monitored by the RAPO board.

Thus, there is now a real possibility of managing all links in the rayon's complex economy as a single entity. This ensures good end results, which is confirmed by the accelerated development of stockraising, our leading branch.

Let me give several figures. In 1975, the rayon sold the state 6,800 tons of meat; last year -- 12,800 tons, nearly twice as much. Milk purchases increased from 36,000 to 43,000 tons. We now have 55,000 head of cattle; we had 43,000 head before. The number of hogs has increased from 38,000 to 68,000.

Our farmworkers are meeting their obligations. During the first 11 months of this year, the state was sold 10,300 tons of meat, 12 percent more than last year, and 38,100 tons of milk, also above last year's procurement volume.

Competition is now widely developed for exemplary livestock wintering and for growth in daily milk yields and weight gains. Party member Drosma Demberga, a milkmaid on "Lubezere" sovkhoz, sets a good example -- she obtains an average of 11 kg of milk per cow each day. Good results are also being achieved by her competitors, Biruta Grishane from "Virbi" sovkhoz and Liga Grinerte, Rasma Kumerdanka and Liliya Reynkholds from "Dundaga" kolkhoz. The experience of the leading workers finds its way to the farms and complexes faster than before now that there is the agroindustrial complex.

We now have 10 complexes, which are producing 36 percent of all our milk. Good results are generally achieved on them. For example, an average of 3,600 kg of milk was obtained per cow last year on the kolkhoz imeni Lenin at the "Birzstalas" complex. Net cost per quintal was 18 rubles and labor expenditures were only 1.5 man-hours. According to preliminary estimates, that result is now being surpassed.

Functions have been precisely delimited in raising livestock. Laborers on "Virbi" sovkhoz are now intensively fattening 7,500 young bulls. Livestock growers of "Kurzeme" kolkhoz are raising calves for fattening on other farms. Nearly 64 percent of all the association's young beef is now being fattened at two specialized farms.

Characteristically, feed production is becoming an independent branch in the rayon. Four association farms are specialized for perennial grass seed production. The work has been set up soundly. A mechanized initial seed treatment center is operating on "Valdgale" sovkhoz and a seed cleaning complex is operating on "Okte" sovkhoz.

Questions of comprehensive farm mechanization are also being resolved better. For example, we have had no disruptions in schedules for the construction and installation of feed shops and equipment to produce vitamin meal. We have acquired a new unit which will be used to make granules from straw and various additives.

But how effectively are the labor resources and fixed production assets of our specialized enterprises being used? In 1979, some 20.5 man-hours was spent per quintal of cattle weight gain, as against 28.7 man-hours on kolkhozes and 23.4 man-hours on sovkhozes of the republic. We spent about 17 man-hours per quintal of hog weight gain in the Talsinskiy RAPO, also significantly less than on average for Latvian kolkhozes. We also succeeded in greatly reducing feed expenditure in meat and milk production.

Successful livestock wintering depends on people's skill. Let me note that 80 percent of our milkmaids have grade I or II skill ratings. Much attention is being paid to training specialists, especially middle-link personnel and workers in the most common occupations. There is a study-course combine. Therefore, the farms are well-staffed with stockraisers and machine operators. Four foremen work at each vitamin meal unit, for example.

There are quite a few other positive aspects as well. Whereas much time was previously wasted repairing machinery which malfunctioned in the wintertime due to the slowness of Sel'khoztekhnika workers, because the longer the repairs took the higher the "machinery service" indicators were, things are now different because the manager of the rayon Sel'khoztekhnika department is at the same time director of an interfarm production mechanization and electrification enterprise. It is directly subordinate to the RAPO, which is solely concerned with repairs and maintenance and which is responsible for the reliability of operation of other equipment.

The rayon has several industrial enterprises engaged in processing agricultural output. They participate actively in solving the economic and social problems of the agroindustrial association. On their part, rural laborers also help these enterprises. Now, for example, fitters and arc welders from the farms are working at the mixed feed plant, readying it for the new season. Another example. For more than a year now, kolkhozes and sovkhozes have been helping the collective of the starch plant and distillery to speed up potato processing and get pulp back to the farms faster for use as a feed supplement.

Five years is not a long time, but we can already state confidently that the new form of management is effective.

Lithuania: Specialized Management By Branch

Vilnyus SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 16 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by V. Gikis, production management sector chief at Lithuanian Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics: "Specialist's Role Growing"]

[Text] The development of agricultural science and technology and the concentration and specialization of plant-growing and stockraising are leading agricultural production towards becoming a variety of industrial production and the labor of farmers towards becoming a variety of industrial labor. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes are now complex economic systems in which a large number of people and highly productive machines and mechanisms influence the object of labor. And the draft "Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and Through 1989" is entirely correct in putting forward the demand that work be continued on perfecting agricultural management.

As is known, the forms of management and labor organization are determined by the nature of the production, by the equipment available and by the technologies being used. Typical of agriculture is its scattered production over a large area, remoteness of production sites from administrative, repair and service centers, high mobility of laborers when working, and the fact that schedules for performing many technological processes coincide. Moreover, another characteristic feature of agriculture is that there is a considerable gap between the start of a technological process and its end result. Thus, several months pass from the start of sowing to the harvest. Consequently, the quality of the labor of a sower can only be finally determined after the harvest. But during that period the areas sown are also subjected to weather, which cannot be ignored. In sum, all this complicates considerably the task of management. Moreover, consideration must be given not just to the technical-organizational aspect of labor, but also to the psychological aspect, given production, specialization, concentration and agroindustrial integration.

In order to ensure that the important tasks set agriculture in the CPSU Central Committee draft for the 26th Party Congress are carried out, a normal production rhythm of the economy as a whole, and effective impact on technological processes, management must become more precise and flexible. In connection, the change-over to centralized production management on the branch principle has taken on vital importance. But both extreme haste, when this transition is effected without proper preparation, and unnecessary conservatism, caution and fear of innovation are identically unacceptable in this important matter.

At present, 1,207 kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other state farms are engaged in agricultural production in the republic. Their average size is over 4,000 ha. The study and practical introduction of the centralized branch form of management was begun back in 1968, when "Girdzhyay" poultry sovkhoz in Yurbarkskiy Rayon and "Kivilyaya" kolkhoz in Akmyanskiy Rayon adopted it. Some 370 farms have now taken that path. Certain conclusions can already be drawn as to how effective the new management system is.

Branch management eliminates such administrative-territorial subdivisions as the brigade, department and farm and creates branch subdivisions -- plant-growing, stock-raising, mechanization, construction. They are headed by former chief specialists who now perform the function of organizational-administrative distribution of material-technical and labor resources, along with their technological functions. In this connection, the demands on them increase. The specialist must not only know the technology to perfection, but also the economics and organization of production.

The restructuring of management according to the branch principle brings specialists closer to production. They directly organize the technological process and have in their hands all the levers and resources to permit running this process at the necessary scientific level. This system grants the specialists a great deal of operational independence and functional ties are decreased. All this heightens their personal responsibility for developing the branch, for end results, which has a positive impact on the running of the farm.

The branch management structure simplifies coordination. It is more economical, inasmuch as it leads to a reduction in the size of the administrative-managerial apparatus. Thus, it has been established that under the new system, the number of subordinates farm leaders have has been reduced by 11 percent and the number under chief agronomists, animal husbandry specialists and mechanical engineers -- by 27, 31 and 22 percent, respectively.

Research done by our institute on more than 300 republic farms has provided rich material for analyzing the effectiveness of the new management principle. Here are some data derived from our comparisons. When branch management is properly set up, agricultural specialists devote 15-20 percent more time to their own functions as technologists and production organizers. Due to the reduction in the size of the administrative apparatus and growth in the output produced per management worker, 13.9 percent more gross agricultural product is obtained than on those farms which have retained territorial management, and profit per ruble of management apparatus wages is 10.2 percent higher. On average per farm, the annual economic impact of introducing the branch management structure totals 36,000 to 40,000 rubles.

A survey of kolkhoz leaders in four republic rayons demonstrated the vitality of the new system, 76.5 percent of the leaders testing the new system having given it a positive evaluation, 13.5 percent being dissatisfied and the remainder refraining from evaluating it. Characteristically, 63.5 percent of the leaders who knew of the concrete advantages of branch management only from the experience of their neighbors favored such management.

But as was already stated, such a transition requires serious preparation. Generalization of the practical work of sovkhozes and kolkhozes which have introduced the branch management principle shows that this form is effective on those farms which

have experienced supervisory personnel and specialists, reliable means of communication and transport, good intrafarm roads, reclaimed land, which are compact and on which plant growing and stockraising are highly concentrated. Such conditions have already been created on many republic farms. They are "Erishkyay" kolkhoz in Panevezhskiy Rayon, "Sotsialistinis kyalyas" kolkhoz in Plungeskiy Rayon, "Ritu aushra" and "Pakhpita velena" kolkhozes in Kedaynskiy Rayon and a number of others. Production intensification demands that they be improved everywhere.

As the data show, at the present stage of agricultural development, branch management yields the greatest impact on those republic farms which are 4,000 ha or less. On larger kolkhozes and sovkhozes, it is appropriate to create a mixed system of management in addition to branch subdivisions, with the leaders of narrowly specialized links situated at the central farmstead or concentrated in one place being subordinated directly to one chief specialist and the leaders of multibranch, dispersed subdivisions operating under the territorial principle.

The experience of the "trailblazers" shows that when branch management is introduced on a farm, operational leadership must be improved as well. Inasmuch as a specialist placed at the head of a branch subdivision is burdened with administrative functions and is the direct organizer of labor in his own sector, it is appropriate to free him from the necessity of solving many day-to-day problems which are often not the field of that particular specialist in terms of the duties of his office, such as collecting various kinds of information, preparing inquiries, acting as expediter, sales and supply, solving repair, construction, municipal- and personal-services problems, and so on. All these duties must be done by corresponding services or individual workers. Their absence on farms now using the branch form of management leads to very overworked production organizers, the specialists. And it is precisely this which is the main reason why individual leaders remain dissatisfied with the new management system. But it is not the system which is at fault, rather a poorly thought-out approach to it and mistakes by the leaders themselves.

Particular note should be made of the role of the dispatcher service under the new management conditions. This link is very necessary on every farm. We have concentrated in this service the collection of all economic and production information, which provides an opportunity for mechanizing the processing of information received from production sectors. Such information lightens the load on supervisors and serves as the initial material for thorough analysis of concrete circumstances which have evolved, for promptly revealing reserves and new trends in the development of equipment and production technologies, and for anticipating new directions in which to improve them. All this is of decisive importance in properly organizing labor, in introducing new forms of labor at the proper time.

Experience shows that the best results in improving management are achieved by those farms which approach the solution of this problem in a comprehensive manner and, along with restructuring, introduce modern means of communication and computer equipment, help improve the skills of supervisors and specialists, and improve leadership methods and the style of work of the management apparatus itself.

But changes in the lower production subdivision management structure are only part of the work.

The present system of managing agriculture as a branch is characterized by a variety of agencies and by multilateral subordination of agricultural enterprises. As a

result, flexibility is lost in solving urgent problems and kolkhoz and sovkhoz supply channels are fouled up.

It would seem that, in connection with this, the draft CPSU Central Committee "Basic Directions" should be amended to include the following provision: "Improve methods of agricultural supervision and agricultural material-technical supply supervision. By granting greater initiative and independence to production subdivisions, increase the responsibility of their leaders for the sectors entrusted to them, make cost-accounting relations between producers, supply-marketing and other service organizations more closely dependent and establish mutual economic interest in carrying out plans. Simplify and standardize the forms and indicators of plan assignments."

Such an addition would, in my view, play an important role in developing the primary link in the country's food program, production.

11052
CSO: 1800

ABKHAZ CITRUS PRODUCTS DISAPPEAR IN TRANSIT

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 6 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by members of SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' raid brigade: D. Kemulariya, chief technologist of the republic citrusgrowing association; A. Triandafilidi, worker from Sovkhoz imeni Il'ich; V. Yelufimov, SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' special correspondent--Abkhazskaya ASSR--Moscow: "Operation 'Citrus'--Or the Story of How Tangerines Disappear in Transit from Orchard to Store"]

[Text] The main region for the cultivation of citrus crops in our country is located beyond the Great Caucasus Ridge. Here are produced every year 200,000 tons of tangerines, lemons, oranges and grapefruit. With such a rather modest amount, it would seem essential to do everything necessary to get each fruit to reach the consumer. But alas, thousands of tons of the valuable products never reach our table.

Arbitration organizations, prosecuting attorneys' offices and people's courts are overcrowded with suits relating to shortages of the subtropical fruits. For the Georgian Citrusgrowing Association alone, the sums claimed now amount to 2.4 million rubles. The newspaper SEL'SKAAYA ZHIZN' has received many disturbing letters concerning defects recently in the sale of the fruits.

... At Dranda Station in Abkhazskaya ASSR, it was reported to the raid brigade that the four-car section for loading of tangerines from Sovkhoz imeni Il'ich found itself at a loss as to what to do. We arrive at the packing plant of this farm. Here more than 120 tons of fruit packed for sale are lying around. Moreover, they have already been lying that way for three days. To this time there should be added another two-three days, as the fruits cut down from the trees are not immediately taken out of the orchards, nor are they immediately crated.

Departure of the railroad refrigerated section to Moscow has been delayed, and thus another 2 days were added to the storage of the tangerines. Six days were needed by the railroad for delivery of the citruses to its ultimate station. This was Rostokino, next to which is the Dzerzhinsk Glavmosplodoovoshchprom Fruit and Vegetable Depot. The unloading of cars began simultaneously at three warehouses. On looking at the seals, we found that one of them was hanging by the ends of the wire, although it had been doubly secured, a fact that was confirmed on examining it at the operational and technical department of the Moscow Administration of Transport Militia. Becoming suspicious that the car had been broken into, we asked the station chief N. Andronova to send a representative to be present when the products were turned over. Stating that the seal of the sovkhoz was still on the car, she categorically refused to do

this. That was unfortunate. We found that that tangerines were eleven crates short. Ten of them had disappeared from car No 873-4977 in transit.

Incidentally, in order to remove a part of the produce, it is not necessary to disturb the seals. We became convinced of this at the Abkhaz Dranda Station: any car can be opened without tearing off of a seal. Station chief Ye. Bolkvadze pointed out in regard to a request to weld additional loops to each door:

"We would then be obliged to weld them to all refrigerated cars made at the Bryansk Plant."

While saying that, he knew that the railroad in accepting freight is responsible for it, but only partially: in the instance where it arrives late or with broken off seals. But if it is standing in place and the tangerines are still missing, then the losses will be to the account of the farm: they failed to provide a full load! For the sake of fairness, it should be said that this happens rarely. The produce is usually "lost" by the railroad or trade enterprises. Fruit and vegetable offices, it turns out, only wait for the finished produce to be sent to them. The partners do not see each other face to face: freight is sent without a trade employee and is accepted without the supplier being present. What this leads to can be seen by visiting Moscow's fruit and vegetable depots. Take one of them--the Dzerzhinsk. The section was immediately turned over to three warehouses. Several persons watched the progress of the unloading. In the first few minutes, a female worker from Warehouse No 24 was caught stealing a crate of tangerines. On the way to the scale, she succeeded in placing on her truck an empty instead of a full crate. Only the tracks of a second stolen crate remained under the car because of recently fallen snow. Passersby approached the unloading place and asked for tangerines. On not getting them, some of them muttered: "Why was it possible before but is not possible now?"

The loss in the first car amounted to 377 kilograms, which exceeds the prescribed norm. But as to how twelve crates of tangerines disappeared from the second car, with the total load "losing" 834 kilograms, neither sovkhoz worker L. Sokhokiya, who was present when they were turned over, nor the members of the raid brigade can explain. As they say, if you are not caught, you are not a thief, although the warehouse workers did not go home with empty hands.

The workers of the fruit and vegetable depot of Volgogradskiy Rayon carried out a "successful operation." Here a section of cars with tangerines arrived from Sikharuli Sovkhoz. It was unloaded the night (!) of 17-18 December not only without the representatives of the supplier but also but also without personnel from the bureau of commodity examination. The result is as follows: the four cars showed a shortage of 7,299 kilograms of tangerines. In the morning they could not even provide acceptance certificates for the produce.

And here is a picture of "unloading" as described by the technical director of the packing plant of Kokhorskiy Citrus Sovkhoz of Abkhazskaya ASSR N. Kvekveskiri: "We sent in November to the Vyborgskiy Fruit and Vegetable Depot of Leningrad two mechanized sections with tangerines--105 tons and 95 tons. We received a telegram concerning a shortage of the fruit in the first section amounting to 3,341 kilograms. To prevent a similar result occurring to the second section, sovkhoz brigade leader G. Shengeliy and I flew there on an emergency basis. The cars were received at the depot on 27 November. Near the fourteenth warehouse, despite my presence

it was a case of outright robbery. The scoundrels tried to steal the tangerines by any means. Crates disappeared one after another. I turned for help to militioners standing nearby, but their response was: "Our job is to protect the warehouses and not to watch over your tangerines." And they did not even make an attempt to halt the theft of state property. And this in the presence of a representative of the sovkhoz. And what happens at the depot when the unloading takes place without him being present?! Then we receive telegrams of a shortage of 3, 4, even 5 tons in a section. And this is repeated from season to season. In the last year, claims against the sovkhoz in regard to quantity and quality of fruits exceeded 129,000 rubles...."

Thus, most citrus fruits are lost because of the outmoded manner of their sale. Actually, why don't trade organizations, as emphasized in decrees repeatedly, accept the ready produce at the places of its production straight from the hands of the supplier?

"In 1979," N. Kakubava, the director of Sikhauruli Sovkhoz says, "we sent to Kurgan together with a representative from the local city fruit and vegetable trade organization 250 tons of tangerines. There were no claims even in the amount of a ruble."

Representatives of Chelyabinsk, Tyumen', Yessentuki and Kislovodsk go directly to farms for citruses on the basis of an agreement. No claims emanate from them. But the chief recipients of produce from citrus orchards--the Moscow Main Administration of Fruit and Vegetable Trade and the Leningrad City Fruit and Vegetable Organization--refuse by hook and by crook to agree to the sensible proposals of their partners.

Five years ago, in order to reduce losses and boost farms' interest in growing and turning over high quality produce, Gosstandart USSR adopted changes in the state standards relating to citrus fruits, providing for determination of their quality at the farm site. Since then, mountains of paper have been spent on correspondence, but, as they say, things have not budged an inch. The USSR Ministry of Trade, on the basis of narrow departmental interests, categorically refuses to accept any and all proposals relating to the acceptance of citrus fruits!

What are the arguments offered for the refusal? "This could lead to a lapse in state discipline of deliveries," writes USSR Deputy Minister of Trade S. Aleshin, "and to the diversion of a large number of specialists from trading organizations of cities and industrial centers of the country for determination of quality and acceptance of citrus fruits on farms, as well as to other serious complications connected with shipment of the produce."

An astonishing answer! What additional serious complications could there be when the present situation is much more than serious?! Of all the arguments, one could agree to only one: the diversion of specialists of trading organizations, for Georgia has 22 pavilions for fruit processing. But L. Gurtskaya, chief of the republic citrusgrowing production association, has brought clarity to this question:

"We could organize shipment of the fruits to Moscow from one pavilion and to Leningrad from another. Each would require the presence of only two-three representatives."

The recently published decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Improving Planning and Economic Stimulation of the Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products" provided an instruction to "ministries and departments of the USSR making purchases of agricultural products to provide in their plans for volume of purchases of these products and their acceptance directly at farms." It would be interesting to note what excuses they will think up at the Ministry of Trade!

7697
CSO: 1800

UZBEKISTAN CONSTRUCTION IN 11TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 3 Jan 81 pp 1-2

[Article by A. Khodzhayev, secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee: "Uzbekistan Construction Projects"]

[Text] The Soviet people have come through the concluding year of the 10th Five-Year Plan with a sense of satisfaction and legitimate pride in the achievements of their country. This past five-year period will go down in the history of our homeland as years of continued upswing in economic and defense might, successful development of science and technology, flowering of culture and steady growth in the well-being of the people. In a speech at the October (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that "this five-year plan has a worthy place in the history of the heroic work of a Soviet people marching confidently on the path to communism."

The first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan is upon us. Its tasks, developing the country in the decade ahead, were set by the October CPSU Central Committee Plenum, USSR Supreme Soviet sessions and the CPSU Central Committee draft for the 26th Party Congress. "The decade ahead," the draft notes, "is a major new stage in creating the material-technical base of communism, developing social relations and shaping the new man. In this period, we will have to ensure the fullest use of the opportunities and advantages of the society of mature socialism, to significantly increase its material and spiritual wealth, its production and scientific-technical potential."

The work results of our republic economy this past five-year plan and last year and the tasks for this year were reviewed and approved by the 18th Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee Plenum and by a Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet session.

Systematic development of the republic economy and continued growth in the well-being of the workers depend in considerable measure on the rates and quality of capital construction. The efforts of construction workers to increase the republic's economic potential have increased year by year.

Over the past five-year period, capital investments in the Uzbekistan economy have been about 25 billion rubles, 7.5 percent more than the five-year assignment and 1.3-fold more than in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Fixed production assets grew 1.4-fold. During these years, we built and put into operation about 100 large industrial enterprises and did a great deal of work in agriculture and other branches of the economy. Uzbekistan workers received upwards of 27 million square meters of housing, which means that during the 10th Five-Year Plan, nearly one-fourth of the republic population experienced the joy of moving into new housing. And housing construction was



[Key on following page]

Key (to map on preceding page):

a. Conventional signs
b. Electric power plants
c. House-building combine
d. Hydroelectric power plants
e. Cotton plant
f. Mines
g. Gas industry
h. Chemical construction projects
i. Fish processing plant
j. Ferrous, nonferrous metallurgy
k. Food industry
l. Machine building
m. Irrigated land
n. Light industry construction projects

1. Aral Sea
2. Nukus
3. Tashkent
4. Andizhan
5. Kokand
6. Samarkand
7. Denau
8. Termez

done in a complex with construction of social, cultural and personal-services projects, which is a party demand that is now an everyday rule for construction workers.

In 1980, we utilized 5.3 billion rubles, or 24 percent more than in 1975, and the start-up of fixed assets increased by 43 percent. Due to this, the amount of unfinished construction was reduced substantially. Last year, the republic put into operation large facilities to produce triacetate cellulose at the Fergana Nitrogen Fertilizers Plant and to produce caprolactam at the Chirchik "Elektrokhimprom" production association. Such large projects as the new turbine at Navoiyskaya GRES and the ninth power unit at Syrdar'inskaya GRES have joined those in operation. We have continued building enterprises to produce consumer goods. We put up a start-up complex at the nonfabric materials factory in Pap, renovated the Kokand Hosiery Spinning Combine, expanded capacity at the Namanganskiy Silk Combine, built three branches of the Tashkent Textile Combine and built an oil extraction plant in Gulistan and other facilities.

Rural construction continued on a broad scale. In 1980, some 105,000 ha of new irrigated land was put into agricultural circulation. Stockraising complexes to raise and fatten hogs were built on "Udarnik" sovkhoz in Dzhizakskaya Oblast and cattle raising and fattening complexes were built on "50 let SSSR" sovkhoz in Surkhandar'inskaya Oblast; we built the meat line of the Yangiyul'skaya Poultry Farm and renovated a number of egg-line poultry farms and other facilities.

Significant results were achieved in building housing and educational, scientific, cultural, public health, municipal- and personal-services institutions. In 1980 we built about six million square meters of housing, schools for 145,000 pupils and kindergartens and day nurseries for nearly 50,000 through all sources of financing. We finished building the new sector of the first line of the Tashkent subway.

The method of cost accounting based on the brigade contract has proven its effectiveness in recent years. Last year, more than 4,200 brigades used the cost-accounting method and did about half of all the construction work done. Such patriotic movements as "Work Without Laggers!," "Two Five-Year Plans In One," the initiative by Sverdlovsk workers to carry out the five-year assignment with fewer workers in their brigades, the initiative by the collective of the No 1 Tashkent House-Building Combine to carry out the five-day assignments in four days, and other initiatives received further development among republic construction workers.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Influence of the Economic Mechanism on Improving Production Efficiency and Work Quality," which orients construction workers towards achieving high end results, has been an important new stage in developing the economy.

A majority of the collectives of construction workers and installers have successfully carried out the plans and socialist obligations of last year and the five-year plan as a whole and have kept their labor word with honor. However, our successes in construction could have been more significant had we used all reserves for accelerating the start-up of projects scheduled for start-up last year. The construction schedules of a number of projects were stretched out and considerable scattering of efforts and funds was permitted. As a result, the amount of unfinished construction remains high, exceeding the normative in some places. Neither have we succeeded in achieving smoother work by construction and installation organizations or the even release of projects for operation throughout the course of the year.

A broad capital construction program has been planned for the republic in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Thus, whereas capital investment will grow by 12-15 percent for the country as a whole, it will grow by 22-[illegible] percent in our republic. This indicates convincingly the concern and attention the party and government give to developing the productive forces of Uzbekistan.

In the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan, we are faced with utilizing 5.6 billion rubles in capital investment from all sources of financing. That is eight percent more than in 1980.

Construction workers have been set the task of ensuring further concentration of efforts and means at start-up and very important construction projects, reducing the level of unfinished construction, and using capital investments effectively by directing them foremost into renovating and retooling enterprises, completing construction projects previously begun, and also into installing facilities directly associated with improving worker well-being. Thus, 69 percent of the capital investment for branches subordinate to the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers is being directed into start-up complexes, as against 54 percent in 1980; they are being increased by 18 percent as compared with 1980 for renovating and retooling existing enterprises. We anticipate reducing unfinished construction from 70.9 percent reported in 1979 to 53 percent. The start-up of fixed assets will grow by 17 percent.

In order to meet the growing demands of the republic economy, the fuel-energy complex will continue to be developed rapidly. Construction workers are obligated to put the 10th power unit, 300,000-kW, at the Syrdar'inskaya GRES into operation by the 26th Party Congress. When it goes on line, the power plant will have reached its designed capacity of three million kilowatts. This year, we will finish building the Navoiyskaya GRES and Gazalkentskaya GES. Installation of the Novoangrenskaya GRES and preparatory work on the 3.2 million-kW Talimardzhanskaya GES will continue. We also plan to put the third line of the Mubarekskiy Gas Processing Plant, to produce five billion cubic meters of fuel, into operation.

As compared with last year, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy output will increase 1.5-fold. We plan to introduce capacities to process an additional 100,000 tons of scrap per year at the Uzbek Metallurgical Combine. Renovation and retooling of the Almalykskiy Mining and Metallurgical Combine will continue and new cooper ore mining and processing capacities will be introduced. We will also continue building the

Uchkulachskiy Lead-Zinc Mine in Dzhizakskaya Oblast as the raw material base for a mining and metallurgical combine.

As in past years, chemical industry will be developed at outstripping rates.

A constant rise in the standard of living is the highest goal of our party. The 1981 plan anticipates considerable expansion of the release of consumer goods. Thus, capital investments in light industry will increase 1.6-fold as compared with 1980. New capacities will go on line at the Andizhanskiy Cotton Combine, the first start-up complex of the Dzhizakskiy Cotton-Spinning Factory will be put into operation, capacities will be increased at the nonfabric materials factory in Pap, and 14 branch cotton combines will begin operating, including five in Andizhanskaya Oblast, two in Bukharskaya Oblast, three in Ferganskaya Oblast and four in the Karakalpak ASSE. Moreover, new capacities will be introduced at the Fergana Textile Combine and the "Atlas" avril fibers production association in Margilan. Construction continues on the second line of the Bukhara and Nukus cotton combines.

An enormous amount of construction work is to be done in rural areas. Upwards of 2.5 billion rubles, nine percent more than in 1980, has been allocated to develop republic agriculture. This year, we are faced with utilizing 96,000 ha of new irrigated land. Construction continues on the Andizhan, Talimardzhan and Gissarakskiy reservoirs and Tuyamuyunskiy hydrosystem, and the capacity of the Akhangaranskiy reservoir will be increased. Pump stations will be installed at two lifts of the Dzhizakskiy Machine Canal, and we will continue mastering the Karshinskaya and Dzhizakskaya steppes and rice lands in the Amudar'ya lowlands.

In accordance with the party food program, we are faced this year with building stock-raising complexes to raise and fatten 5,000 head of young beef, to produce milk from 2,400 cows, and with introducing poultry farm capacities for 7.3 million poultry per year.

Particular attention will be paid to housing construction in a complex with cultural and personal-services projects. This year, we plan to build about six million square meters of housing, schools to seat 153,000, kindergartens and day nurseries for some 52,000 children, hospitals, polyclinics, scientific, cultural and personal-services institutions through all sources of financing. A radio and television transmitting station will be put into operation in Tashkent. Construction of the first sector of the second subway line will be continued.

Broader use must be made of the system of continuous planning and flow-line construction in housing. We must increase the responsibility of contractor organization, construction and building materials industry enterprise leaders for the efficiency and quality of all work. Introduction of the brigade contract is an important lever in improving construction quality and scheduling. Beginning this year, all republic construction organizations must be transferred to this method.

One pressing task is to increase labor productivity and construction quality, which are directly linked to the introduction of the brigade contract, accelerating scientific and technical progress, and using effective new materials and components.

Finally, as of this year, all construction organizations are faced with changing over to the new form of management which anticipates a transition to two- and three-link

management systems. The construction and installation associations must become the basic cost-accounting subdivisions. This permits a precise delimitation of the rights and duties of management agencies, simplifies their structure and increases the speed and flexibility of this work. In this regard, the activity of construction organizations will be evaluated only on the basis of finished output and projects released for operation.

This year is the year of the 26th Party Congress and the first year of the new five-year plan. The CPSU Central Committee draft for the 26th Party Congress, which is being discussed widely in all republic construction and installation organizations, demands that we build quickly, economically and at a high technical level. This demand must become a guide to action for all republic construction workers and must be the basis of socialist competition for a worthy greeting to the 26th Party Congress. It is the duty of construction workers to direct all their efforts, from the very first days of the year, towards improving construction efficiency and quality.

11052
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TURKMEN NATIONAL POET NOT A SUFI MYSTIC, SCHOLAR PROTESTS

Ashkhabad IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK TURKMENSKOY SSR: SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK in Russian No 6, 1980 pp 50-57

[Article by R. Mustakov, Turkmen State University imeni A. M. Gor'kiy: "On the Question of Sufism in the Creative Work of Makhtumkuli in Connection with the Statements of European Orientalists"]

[Text] The figure of the great Turkmen classic Makhtumkuli has constantly been at the center of attention of European reserachers who have written about Turkmen literature. The poet's sensitive heart reacted to many important problems of his own times, but, at the same time, his creative opus also contains poems which were written under the influence of Sufism. The inexactness of the chronological sequence of the poems has made it difficult to trace the evolution in the poet's world view. One of the disputed points is the question of Sufism in his creative work.

The 19th-century Polish orientalist Aleksander Chodzko (who has already been written about in the works of A. Ye. Krymskiy, A. N. Samoylovich, B. A. Karryyev, D. Nuraliyev, and others), who published the epic "Kerogly" and poems by Turkmen poets in English, wrote a brief biographical sketch of Makhtumkuli. In his opinion, by receiving his poetic gift through revelation, Makhtumkuli also became a preacher: "...from that time on he abandoned Sunnism and became an enthusiastic Sheah; he preached this religion to the Turkmens...and died worshipped as a saint" [13, p 39]. Inasmuch as the word "Sheah" is not encountered in English dictionaries, we can assume that this is a transcribed translation of the Turkmen word "shykh," which signifies the head of a dervish order, a spiritual mentor, or the name of a tribe. Chodzko could have imbued this word with another meaning, i. e., "Shiite." But, as is known from the poems themselves, the poet was not a Shiite; moreover, he used the term "kizylbashy" (i. e., Shiite-Muslims--R. M.) to designate his own foes.

Indications of Makhtumkuli's role as a mentor and his role as a leading Sufi in society are also encountered in an article by the 19th-century Hungarian orientalist, A. Bamberi [3, p 390]; it is permeated with the thought of Makhtumkuli's belonging to the Sufi poets. Bamberi wrote that "Makhtumkuli is not even in the slightest any different from Khodzha Akhmet Yezevi" [3, p 391]. While admitting the thought that not everything in Makhtumkuli's creative work can be related to Sufism, Bamberi, nevertheless, did assert that the "contents of his poetry in most cases consists of poems which are in complete accord with the fundamental teaching of Sufism and speak about the transitory nature of everything secular and the

insignificance of our strivings in this world" [3, p 391]. Bamberi includes Makhtumkuli himself in one of the Sufi orders without supporting his statement with any sort of proofs. He wrote: "One of such dervishes, most of whom belonged to the religious section of Bakh-ed-din Nakshbandi, was Makhtumkuli" [3, p 390].

This opinion of the Hungarian scholar was subjected to criticism by B. Kerbabayev, B. A. Karryyev, and D. Nuraliyev. The last-named criticized the erroneousness of certain of Bamberi's assertions about Makhtumkuli, and, in the first place, he demonstrated the inadmissability of including the poet among the Sufi poets [8, pp 75-79].

The thought that Makhtumkuli belongs among the poets of the Sufi school also is clearly sounded in the sketch of Turkmen literature by the Czechoslovak scholar, Jozef Blazkovic: "Nevertheless, Makhtumkuli belonged to the Sufi school with its ideology of mystic pantheism..." [12, p 148], but he adds immediately here that Makhtumkuli "...s out boldly against the ignorance and arbitrary behavoir of the official representatives of Islam as well as against the feudal-bai [rich landowners in Central Asia], exploitation and social injustice" [12, p 148]. We should take note of two fundamental theses which proceed from the works of the abovementioned European authors: first, the idea that Makhtumkuli was a poet of the Sufi school, and second, that he supposedly belonged to a Sufi order (according to Bamberi, to the Nakshibandi Order).

In order to elucidate the correctness of the assertions set forth here, ir would be feasible to dwell in greater detail on the place of Sufism in Makhtumkuli's creative work. The unresolved quality of this problem is manifested if only in the fact that many researchers of Makhtumkuli's creative work, justifiably pointing to Sufi tendencies in the poet's creative work, remain without an answer to the question of the place of Sufism in his creative work. Also unexplained to the present day is the question of whether or not Makhtumkuli belongs among the Sufi poets, although opinions on this score have already been uttered. Likewise we must not close our eyes to certain Sufi works of his, which, however, do not occupy the principal place in Makhtumkuli's creative work.

Among the works devoted to the problem of Sufism in Makhtumkuli's creative art, the work by A. Khaidov [11] should be singled out. This author provides a detailed analysis of Makhtumkuli's Sufi poems, writes about the poet's teachers, pantheism, and Khurrufism in the poet's creative work. Unfortunately, however, he fails to furnish a precise answer to the question of the place of Sufism in the poet's creative work. A. Khaidov writes as follows: "However, the reader should not consider Makhtumkuli as only a poet of the Sufi school. This poet's creative range was extremely wide. He wrote poems about love of one's native land, life, courage and cowardice, the creation of a unified Turkmen state, and other topics" [11, p 83]. In order to resolve this question, we must turn to Makhtumkuli's poems themselves.

In the poet s works on religious themes one encounters the names of many well-known representatives of Sufism, such as Veysel Kara (or Soltan Veys), Khodzha Akhmed Yasevi, Shibli, Bayezid, Khakim ata, Khodzha Yusuf, Khamadani, Gyozli ata, Nur ata, Baba Dargan, Mirkulal, Bakhaveddin Naksbendi, and others. Sufi names are used by the poet in a positive sense. For example, in the poem "Bady-sabany gorsem":

Dekhistanyn bayrynda
Bady-sabany gorsem;
Bakhavetdin, Mirkulal,
Zenni babany gorsem [6, p 42].

The poet desires to see the places connected with the names of well-known Sufis, and he wants to bow down to the holy places. The ardor, the temperament of the poem, the poet's desire to travel, to see India, Turkestan, and other countries allows us to presume that this poem was written during the poet's younger days. Evidently, the idea of rejecting secular matters and the quest for a spiritual mentor aroused the poet at this stage:

Kamil ayagna bash goy, yalanchydan el geter,
Toba kylyp, bir pirin topragna bulan konlum [6, p 364].

It is well known that an abnegation of secular affairs is one of the fundamental principles of Sufism. When entering upon the path of Sufism, a murid (student, discipline, pilgrim--R. M.) in his questions must entirely rely on his spiritual guide, i. e., the murshid or pir. In the poem cited here the poet wishes to set out on the path in dervish clothing ("Abdal zhndesin geyip, git divana garyshda" [6, p 364]). Further on a situation is repeated which is characteristic of Sufi poems. The poet declares that "he twice drank the drink of sorrow, but he had no more strength for the third time":

Magtymguly, nosh etdim gam badasyn iki tas,
Uch icherge ragbet yok chun zhandan boldum khalas [6, p 364].

The motifs of renouncing earthly affairs, the quest for a spiritual mentor, and the desire to wander about with the dervishes are repeated in the poem "Dashlar bile" [6, pp 550--551]. The poet's vascillations, the spirit of the poem, where Makhtumkuli says that his "soul is in flight" ("Konul pervaz eder dostlar" [6, p 550]), and, finally, the indefiniteness of purpose, the desire to engage in something or other--all this impels one to the thought that the poems was written at an early stage of creative work. The above-mentioned phrase is also encountered in the poem "Oglum--Azadym," in which Makhtumkuli, addressing his father, says:

Zhylavdary bolsam Yazyrkhan pirin,
Konul gushy pervaz urar pakyryn...

Bu gun yedi gundur, "alkham" okyryn,
Shat eyle konlumi, goyber Azadym [6, p 34].

In spirit and content both poems are similar, and they could have been written at approximately the same period of time. Also deserving of attention is the fact that the poet calls himself a dervish ("pakyr"), a fakir. It may be supposed that the wandering dervishes, imbued with romanticism, evoked a particular sympathy in the young Makhtumkuli. This most likely explains his favorable inclination toward the dervishes in the poems in which he writes that there is no one closer to God than the dervishes, and he advises people to accept their blessings. He compares them with a stormy river or a high moon:

Nirde dervush gersen, baryp alkysh al,
Dervushden yeg khich kim yokdur khudaya [6, p 557].

And further on:

Dervushge tagi eden aegi-bizhaydyr,
Dervush yerde derya ya gokde aydyr [6, p 557].

Clearly it is to this period in the poet's creative work that we should ascribe his poem entitled "Kalandar" (wandering dervish--R. M.), in which Makhtumkuli calls the dervish the "lord of all the beloved" (beloved in God--R. M.) and asks that he be guided onto the right path; he expresses a readiness to give the dervish everything:

Magtymguli aydar, istikhan senin,
Ten suyegin damar senin gan senin,
Gymmat uchin akyl senin, zhan senin,
Dodagyma tutgul tasy, galandar [6, p 107].

We should also pay attention to the fact that the names of well-known Sufis are encountered not in the pessimistic poems but in those poems which could have been written at the beginning of this poet's creative path. These include "Turgul diydiler" (in which the poet receives the poetic gift), "Badyrsabany gorsem" (when the poet burns with the desire to set off on a journey), or "Seyran ichinde," "Seyranda," "Shondadyr," in which lightness, enthusiasm, delight, and worship are felt for the well-known holy mean of the past. In the poet's elegaic, pessimistic poems, presumably written by Makhtumkuli during his middle age, names of the Sufis are not only not mentioned, but God's indifference to the poet's lot is emphasized.

One can also judge about the poet's penchant for Sufism by the poem "Chagdyr bu chaglar," in which the author speaks about his own thirtieth birthday ("Indi ayak basdyn otuz oyune" [6, p 639]). He desires not to be pushed aside from the "path of the travelers" and declares that the time had come to drink the cup from the hand of a friend and depart from his own personal "I" ("Menlikden gachylar chagdyr by chaglar" [6, p 639]). According to the doctrine of Sufism, "man's highest happiness is to reject the personal 'I,' the body given birth by a mother and to immerse oneself in the contemplation of the Divinity, to disperse oneself in Him just like a drop in the ocean and thus to be united with Him" ["ittikhad, tavkhid" [5, p 133]). Makhtumkuli speaks about the highest stage of Sufism--the "khakikat" ("truth") and declares that it is impossible to travel along the path of the "khakikat" without a guide:

Khakykatyn yollaryn, rekhbersiz gezmek olmaz [6, p 529].

Like a true Sufi, the poet, setting off on the path (tarikat), languishes with an ardent love for Him (for God--R. M.), wishes to see Him, to commune with Him, seeks Him, and becomes sad:

Magtymguli, cheker yaryn gamyny,
Gezip tapa bilmez royy zemini [6, p 529].

But in certain cases the poet in a state of ecstasy or "khal'," attains the stage of ma'rifat ("knowing"). In the poem "Nary dilberin" he feels his own closeness to God and senses God's gaze trained upon him. Reaching a state of ecstasy, the poet declares that God (literally "yar"--R. M.) himself gives him wine and sits together with him:

Khosh meylisler gurup gozel dost bile,
Yar mana mey berdi , gitdim sust bile,
Khemle kyldy mana yuz mun kast bile,
Sokdy meni yylan mary dilberin [6, p 640].

The terms "gozel dost, yar, dilber" are used in Makhtumkuli's Sufi poems as synonyms of God (Allah). The ardor and enthusiasm of the young, energetic Makhtumkuli, attracted by the teachings of Sufism and by its mysticism, gradually became weaker. At the age of 34 ("otuz dort yasha bardyn bu zhakhanda ne gordun" [6, p 515] Makhtumkuli speaks about the rapid flow of life, about attention to man, and he asks people to look upon the world with open eyes, to awake from slumber:

Khich kimge baky bermez, dovrana nazar eyle,
Dovranyga guvangan, ynsana nazar eyle [6, p 517].

In the poet's Sufi poems one already sense notes of disenchantment; there is a lack of the former ardor and enthusiasm. The poet already calls the love of God the "poison of another" and declares that although he has "drunk his fill of another's poison, God is cold to him":

Gana-gana ichdim dostun zekhrini
Zekhrin shypa sansam, salmaz mekhrini [6, p 76].

Makhkumtuli calls his attraction for Sufism an ailment (dert) and sees no exit out of this blind alley:

Magtymguly, ol menzile, diyara
Giren gaydyp chyka bilmez kenara.
Yaranlar, bu derde barmydyr chere?
Zhovranyp ortenip gezmeli boldum [6, p 77].

From fruitless quests after tormented vacillations the poet arrives at the thought of rejecting this "unattainable passion" [7, p 138]:

Magtymguly, gech namysdan, aryndan
El getergil bu vepasyz kerinden [6, p 26].

In another of this poet's poems there appear verses which warn against the teachings of Sufism, and "against the drink of sorrow" ("gamyn chemmesin ichme" [6, p 529], while the main thing is that he asks God not to interfere in his affairs:

Yagshy-yaman ishinge, ya biribar garyshma [6, p 529].

According to the teachings of Sufism, in order to draw close to God, a Sufi must kill his own will and personality, must reach physical exhaustion by means of endless mentions of the name of God, expressing one's love for Him. The poet

describes such a state of his own in the poem "Yygglal gecher khalymga." This fact has also been noted by A. Khaidov [11, pp 58--59]. The poet, full of sorrow and powerlessness, expresses his indifference to everything, and he regrets what was done and what he has engaged in:

Pushmanda men eden etmish keriaden,
Bipervayam bolan bolmush baryadan [6, p 90].

The poet has been brought to such a piteable state, according to his own unambiguous statement, by his love for God. He writes that the "love for God has become his torment and fate."

Khak yshkydyr bizni goyan kozlere
Bu kozlerdir kysmat bolan bizlere...[6, p 90].

In this poem Makhtumkuli emphasizes that his "wide body redeemed sorrow" ("Gin govrem gam basypdayr ezunden" [6, p 90]), and his love for God--"turned even youth into old age" ("Garrylyga dender Yigit chaglary" [6, p 90]). Consequently, the poet at this time was not old, or at least he did not put into this poem the attributes of old age; the logically strong Makhtumkuli was yoked and oppressed by his attraction for Sufism, and it is possible that for this reason the poet uses such phrases as: "the mountains are melting down like lead," "the tiger is losing its strength, and the wolf is turning into a pussycat." In the poem "Gider sen" he already has doubts about the Sufi doctrine:

Magtymguly dyshdun yshkyn guzeriye,
Kim bar sozlesherge baryp nazarna [6, p 532].

The influence of Sufism on Makhtumkuli weakened, according to all the evidence, when the poet was about 40 years old. If in the above-mentioned poem "Gider sen" the poet doubted the doctrine of Sufism, in "Azhap eyyam gelmedi," written at the age of 40 ("Kyrka gadam goydum, kesem dolmushdyr" [6, p 435]) he is full of bitterness in connection with the difficult position of poor people. But the most interesting thing is that the poet criticizes the sheiks and the Sufis, and he calls them persons without honor or conscience:

Pirler royun achdy, zhuvan seyerdir,
Namyssyzy sopy alyp eyerdir [6, p 436].

Such a position by the poet is not in accord with the position of a Sufi, a passive ascetic and hermit. At the age of 50 ("Eya dostlar, elle yetishdi salym" [6, p 108]) Makhtumkuli declares his powerlessness to serve God:

Khaknyn gullugyna yokdur mezhalym [6, p 108].

Having uttered his refusal to serve God (Allah), the poet understands that God is also indifferent to him at a difficult time ("Dinlemez arzymy ol khak, mende dostum, chare yok" [6, p 139]). This thought is repeated more than once in the poems which were written in his old age. At the age of 60 ("Almysha azm urdy gartashan salym" [6, p 123]), Makhtumkuli wrote as follows:

Nalysh etsem, arzym yetmez ol khuda,

Rekhm eden bolmady, bagtym garadyr [6, p 122].

Such an acknowledgement already undermines the very Muslim doctrine of God (Allah) as "ominiscient, most wise, all-seeing, and the best of judges" [9, pp 64--65] etc. We should also turn our attention to such poems by Makhtumkuli as "Akhyrzamana," "Alachsyz," "Kere dondi," "Nyshan," "Gacha bashlady," "Gide bashlady," "Etup baradyr"; they are outstanding among others of his sharply critical trend, and they are very close to each other in both contents and style. The poet criticizes the decline of morals, the venality of mullahs and judges, the arbitrary behavior of rich men, but he comes down particularly hard on the representatives of Sufism. He calls them unworthy ignoramuses and tormentors of the people:

Ishan, molla, pir, sopular
Ilata azara dondi [6, p 406].

The vices of the life around him and the worsening even without this of the hard lot of the people compel the poet to speak about the end of the world. In one of the above-mentioned poems, in stressing his own old age and feeling his powerlessness to change anything, he exclaims:

Akhyrynda sende garryp olmedin,
Oturyp sen bir bichere alachsyz [6, p 401].

In the poem entitled "Gacha bashlady" the poet, again emphasizing his own old age, writes as follows:

Garryga aylandy biz goren yashlar,
Dolandy ayaga biz goren bashlar [6, p 289].

The references to old age may serve as a basis for supposing that the sharp criticism of the existing order, of the social structure, in particular, the criticism of the representatives of Sufism appeared after his abandonment of Sufism, at the second stage of his creative path, presumably after the age of 40. Such an evolution in the poet's world view is not by chance. The stormy events of personal and social life compelled him to look at the world differently, and they played an enormous role in forming the poet's world view. Separation from his beloved (Mengli) and from his brothers (Abdulla and Mametsapa), the death of his mother and father, the death of his sons, the frequent incursions of foreign predators, inter-tribal dissensions, and the difficult position of the working people--all this dispelled the rosy mist of youth, those illusions which still remained from the times of his studies at the medresa.

Thus, returning to the assertions of the European orientalists about Makhtumkuli belonging to the poets of the Sufi school, one may make the following conclusions: in the first place, he cannot be relagated to the poets of the Sufi school, inasmuch as the Sufi motifs are only characteristic of the poet's works which were written (according to his own words) in his youth. During his mature years Makhtumkuli departed from Sufism (this is evident from his poems); in the second place, there are no proofs, facts, or sources which testify that the poet belonged to any specific sect or order. S. M. Demidov wrote as follows in his work: "An analysis of the poem 'Divana geldi' allows us to make an assumption about the poet's particular sympathies toward, and perhaps even his belonging to, the Nakshbendi Order.

This thought was already expressed in his own time by the Turkish literary scholar and historian, Kerpyulyu-zade, who emphasized the considerable influence of Sufism on Makhtum-Kuli" [4, pp 92--93]. However, we need to make a refinement here: an attentive reading of the poem "Divana geldi" calls attention to the following fact: the dervishes noisily surround the poet and set up a loud zikr (zeal) ("Nagralar chekildi, semag (sema--R. M.) urdular" [6, p 644]). But, as is well known, the Nakshbandi Order practiced a silent zikr, without singing, music, or dancing. In another poem, "Bilmedim," when the poet in a state of ecstasy sees amid the surrounding objects an image, the face of God, then at that time a loud (manifest) zeal is again set up. ("Sheykhler turdy, yigitleri raks etdi" [6, p 552]--'The sheiks stood up, and the youths danced'). The loud zeal was characteristic of the Yasevi Order.

An analysis of Makhtumkuli's Sufi poems shows that he stood closer to one of the first representatives of the Turkic-speaking Sufi poetry, Khodzha Akhmed Yasevi (12th century), whom he called the "lord of the world":

Ya yklym eyesi Akhmet Yasavy
Menin sakhypzhemalymy gordunmi? [6, p 24].

This fact was noted in his time by A. N. Samoylovich in the article "Makhtumkuli and Khakim Ata" [10, pp 13--16]. Moreover, the mentor of Bakhauddin Nakshbendi, Seyt Emir Kulal, was also a follower of Khodzha Akhmed Yasevi. Hence, Makhtumkuli's sympathies for these followers of Yasevi are fully explicable, though again we can speak merely about sympathy and not about the poet's belonging to a certain order. The poet himself wrote as follows in this regard:

Sen nichik Magtymguly, yamanlygyn unutmadyn?
Kekhi-kekhi zalym oldun, gorgeninden gaytmadyn,
Kekhi-kekhi sopy boldun, khich kharamdan datmadyn,
Bilmedim, sen kaysy boldun, belli bir ish tutmadyn...
Ne sypakhylyk bile, ne bir mollalyk bile [6, p 520].

In another poem the poet again repeats this thought:

Ne dervush men, ne molla, ne sopy ekhli dester [6, p 21].

Consequently, Makhtumkuli, according to his very own words, was not a follower of the Sufis, and there is nothing to add to this.

We should only note that the definition of Makhtumkuli as a Sufi poet, which has already become a cliche in the West, is lacking in any scientific grounds. On the contrary, Makhtumkuli led Turkmen literature out from under the influence of Sufism. This poet's greatness lies precisely in the fact that he was able to find within himself the strength to free himself from Sufism and mysticism and to take a step in the direction of realism. Makhkumkuli's poetry reflected the most burning problems of his times, and the poet's life was inextricably bound up with the people's struggle for its interests. Makhtumkuli died, according to A. Bambery, "at the time of the civil wars between the Yomuts and the Geoklens: his great soul could not stand the sight of brothers killing each other" [2, p 158].

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